PAPER CADAVERS

THE ARCHIVES OF DICTATORSHIP IN GUATEMALA

KIRSTEN WELD

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DUKE UNIVERSITY PRESS DURHAM AND LONDON 2014

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Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper ∞
Designed by Heather Hensley
Typeset in Whitman by Copperline Book Services, Inc.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Weld, Kirsten, 1982–
Paper cadavers : the archives of dictatorship in Guatemala / Kirsten Weld.
pages cm — (American encounters/global interactions)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-8223-5597-7 (cloth : alk. paper)
ISBN 978-0-8223-5602-8 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Guatemala—Politics and government—1945–1985—Sources.
2. Guatemala. Policía Nacional. Archivo Histórico.
3. Guatemala—Relations—United States—Sources.
4. United States—Relations—Guatemala—Sources.
5. Archives—Political aspects.
I. Title. II. Series: American encounters/global interactions.
F1466.5.W45 2014
972.8105'2—dc23 2013026391

Photographs on cover and p. i by Daniel Hernández-Salazar
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For the workers, past and present,
of the Proyecto para la Recuperación del
Archivo Histórico de la Policía Nacional

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AEU	Association of University Students, University of San Carlos (Asociación de Estudiantes Universitarios)
AFPC	Accord on the Strengthening of Civil Power and the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society (Acuerdo de Fortalecimiento del Poder Civil y Función del Ejército en una Sociedad Democrática)
AGCA	General Archives of Central America (Archivo General de Centroamérica)
AGSAEMP	Archives and Support Services of the Presidential General Staff (Archivos Generales y Servicios Apoyados del Estado Mayor Presidencial)
AHPN	Historical Archives of the National Police (Archivo Histórico de la Policía Nacional)
AID	Agency for International Development
ARENA	Nationalist Republican Alliance, El Salvador (Alianza Republicana Nacionalista)
AVEMILGUA	Association of Military Veterans of Guatemala (Asociación de Veteranos Militares de Guatemala)
BIEN	Special Investigations and Narcotics Brigade (Brigada de Investigaciones Especiales y Narcóticos)
BROE	Special Operations Reaction Brigade (Brigada de Reacción de Operaciones Especiales)
CACIF	Coordinating Committee of Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial, and Financial Associations (Comité Coordinador de Asociaciones Agrícolas, Comerciales, Industriales, y Financieras)
CADEG	Anti-Communist Council of Guatemala (Consejo Anticomunista de Guatemala)
CCI	International Advisory Board, Project for the Recovery of the National Police Historical Archives (Consejo Consultivo Internacional)
CCN	National Advisory Board, Project for the Recovery of the National Police Historical Archives (Consejo Consultivo Nacional)

CEH — Commission for Historical Clarification (Comisión de Esclarecimiento Histórico)
CEM — Center for Military Studies (Centro de Estudios Militares)
CICIG — International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (Comisión Internacional Contra la Impunidad en Guatemala)
CNT — National Workers' Central (Central Nacional de Trabajadores)
CNUS — National Committee on Trade Union Unity (Comité Nacional de Unidad Sindical)
COCP — Joint Operations Center of the National Police (Centro de Operaciones Conjuntas)
COE — Special Operations Commando (Comando de Operaciones Especiales)
CRIO — Regional Telecommunications Center (Centro de Reunión de Información y Operaciones)
CUC — Campesino Unity Committee (Comité de Unidad Campesina)
DGPN — Director-General of the National Police
DIC — Department of Criminal Investigations
DINC — Criminal Investigations Division (División de Investigación Criminal)
DIT — Department of Technical Investigations
DNSA — Digital National Security Archive
EGP — Guerrilla Army of the Poor (Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres)
EMDN — National Defense General Staff (Estado Mayor de la Defensa Nacional)
EMGE — Army General Staff (Estado Mayor General del Ejército)
EMP — Presidential Staff (Estado Mayor Presidencial)
ESA — Secret Anti-Communist Army (Ejército Secreto Anticomunista)
FAFG — Forensic Anthropology Foundation of Guatemala (Fundación de Antropología Forense de Guatemala)
FAMDEGUA — Association of the Families of the Detained and Disappeared in Guatemala (Asociación de Familiares de Detenidos-Desaparecidos de Guatemala)
FAR — Rebel Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes)
FERG — Robin García Student Front (Frente Estudiantil Robin García)
FRG — Guatemalan Republican Front (Frente Republicano Guatemalteco)
FUR — United Revolutionary Front (Frente Unido de la Revolución)
GAM — Mutual Support Group (Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo)
GOG — Government of Guatemala

HIJOS	Sons and Daughters for Identity and Justice and Against Forgetting and Silence (Hijos e Hijas por la Identidad y la Justicia y Contra el Olvido y el Silencio)
HRDAG	Human Rights Data Analysis Group
ICA	International Cooperation Administration
ICITAP	U.S. Criminal Investigations Training Assistance Program
IIAA	Institute of Inter-American Affairs
INTA	National Institute for Agrarian Transformation (Instituto Nacional de Transformación Agraria)
ISAAR	International Standard Archival Authority Record
ISAD(G)	International Standard for Archival Description (General)
JPT	Patriotic Workers' Youth (Juventud Patriótica de Trabajo)
MINUGUA	United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala
MLN	Movement of National Liberation
MONAP	National Movement of Pobladores (Movimiento Nacional de Pobladores)
MP	Public Ministry
NOA	New Anti-Communist Organization (Nueva Organización Anticomunista)
ODHAG	Human Rights Office of the Archbishop of Guatemala (Oficina de Derechos Humanos del Arzobispado de Guatemala)
OPS	Office of Public Safety
ORPA	Revolutionary Organization of People in Arms
PAC	Civil Self-Defense Patrols (Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil)
PDH	Human Rights Ombudsman's Office (Procuraduría de los Derechos Humanos)
PGT	Guatemalan Workers' Party (Partido Guatemalteco de Trabajo)
PMA	Mobile Military Police (Policía Militar Ambulante)
PN	National Police
PNC	National Civil Police
PR	Revolutionary Party
PRAHPN	Project for the Recovery of the National Police Historical Archives (Proyecto para la Recuperación del Archivo Histórico de la Policía Nacional)
PSD	Social Democratic Party
PSP	Public Safety Program
REMHI	Interdiocesan Project for the Recuperation of Historical Memory (Proyecto Interdiocesano de Recuperación de la Memoria Histórica)

RMU	Master Location Registry (Registro Maestro de Ubicación)
SCUGA	Special Commando Unit (Unidad de Comando Especial del Ejército de Guatemala)
SEDEM	Security in Democracy
SEPAZ	Presidential Peace Secretariat (Secretaría de la Paz de la Presidencia de la República)
SIC	Criminal Investigations Section (Sección de Investigaciones Criminales)
SIPROCI	Civilian Protection System (Sistema de Protección Civil)
STUSC	University of San Carlos Employees' Union (Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Universidad de San Carlos)
UAE	Special Investigations Unit, Human Rights Ombudsman's Office (Unidad de Averiguaciones Especiales)
URNG	Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca)
USAC	University of San Carlos
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

INTRODUCTION
THE POWER OF ARCHIVAL THINKING

In the dark of a restless night during the late 1970s, a young Guatemalan named Raúl Perera shot into wakefulness from a dream so unusual that he remembers it vividly thirty-five years later. He cannot quite recall the date. He knows that it was after he joined the Guatemalan Workers' Party (PGT), the outlawed communist party, and became a vocal leader of his Guatemala City trade union, but before the two attempts on his life that left a bullet scar along his forearm, a close friend dead, and no option for him but to begin a long exile in Mexico. Amid years of activism and war, that one night has haunted Raúl ever since because it brought him a vision so fantastical that it verged on the absurd. That night, his subconscious granted him entrance to a forbidden space: the archives kept by his country's feared National Police.[1]

Once inside, Raúl crept along the archives' labyrinthine corridors in the crepuscular light. He yanked open drawers and thumbed through file folders thick with surveillance photographs of loved ones and reports detailing informants' infiltration of leftist groups. He mined the files, learning how the police organized its death squads, what sorts of information they collected on citizens, and what could be gleaned about the fates of disappeared comrades. In Raúl's waking life—which he spent dodging, not courting, the attention of state security forces—such acts would have been inconceivable transgressions, sure to be met with lethal retribution. Generations of dictators and elites had long directed the National Police (PN) to suppress not only organized resistance but any and all forms of oppositional thinking, eventually using it to help execute the Cold War counterinsurgency campaign for which Guatemala will always be notorious. During that campaign, police administered spy networks; they crushed demonstrations; they did the dirty work of generals and political leaders; they followed, abducted, tortured, and killed. With a terrifying blend of clumsiness and zeal, they targeted schoolteachers, students, progressive priests, peasant farmers, social democratic politicians, street children, and Marxist revolutionaries alike. Raúl was hardly the only Guatemalan whose reveries the police tormented.

So it seemed unreal when, decades later, he found himself inside the police's archives once more. This time, however, it was no dream. "The very color of the pages, the fonts, and everything about the documents in my dream turned out to be exactly how they looked in real life," Raúl reflected incredulously after several years' work on a pathbreaking initiative to put the once-secret police records at the service of postwar justice.[2] In a serendipitous coup that none had ever imagined possible, a small contingent of human rights activists had gained access to the National Police's long-lost archives. Investigators from Guatemala's Human Rights Ombudsman's Office (PDH), while conducting an unrelated inspection on police property in July 2005, stumbled upon what seemed to be vast quantities of old papers. After surveying the sprawling warehouse—a former detention and torture center once known as *la isla* (the island), with spattered cinderblock walls and cell-like inner chambers—and navigating its maze of rooms piled high with bundles of moldy records dating back more than a century, the investigators realized that they had uncovered the largest collection of secret state documents in Latin American history.[3]

The news spread quickly in a country still deeply divided after nearly four decades of brutal counterinsurgent warfare, but the discovery raised more questions and controversies than it resolved. How would the find—an estimated eighty million decaying pages—be managed? Who would have control over this potentially explosive cache of records, believed to contain damning evidence of state abuses from an era of forced disappearances, political assassinations, and genocide? Could these archives offer a new chance at postwar reckoning, which remained stalled more than a decade after the end of a conflict that took the lives of as many as 200,000 citizens?[4]

Raúl was among the first members of a tiny team, soon to grow, that took stock of the find. Its members would take on the arduous task of sorting through the half-rotten, disordered heaps of paper, hoping to rescue a dark portion of their nation's past. Grasping for a manageable place to start, the earliest archival recovery volunteers began by rescuing a huge mound of personal identity cards that lay decomposing in a half-completed room at the building's rear. The majority of the 250,000 cards had survived, but only because sun and water exposure had transformed those at the top of the pile into a tough papier-mâché crust that protected the others beneath. As Raúl sifted through more and more records, on his hands and knees alongside fellow activists clad in face masks and rubber gloves, he routinely stumbled upon the names of friends and acquaintances now alive only in archives and memories. He did not know that a Central American archivist decades earlier had described

such documents as "paper cadavers" in need of "resurrection," but he would have found the metaphor almost painfully apt; in some cases, the archives revealed companions' fates for the first time.[5] It was difficult labor, made no easier by the arson attempts and death threats that periodically reminded the volunteers of the real risks still faced in Guatemala by those seeking to unearth the war's history.

How had these mountains of paper, with all the power and social control they represented, never been destroyed? Why were they all but abandoned, yet still deemed threatening enough for the Guatemalan government to keep them secret from postwar truth commission investigators? Raúl's life story—his past and present encounters with the police and its archives in dreams and in life—encapsulated a tumultuous and unsettled half century of Guatemalan history. How had this political exile, after some thirty years of struggle and failed revolution, found himself in the company of others like him, using the files of their former victimizers as part of an unprecedented effort to rewrite history? And would their collective effort finally yield justice?

People study history in order to participate in contemporary politics; we recover the past in order to look to the future. As such, documents, archives, and historical knowledge are more than just the building blocks of politics—they are themselves sites of contemporary political struggle. We argue and disagree, ardently, about history. We interpret the same documents and events in myriad, divergent ways. We push for state records to be made public, decry their censorship, and support those whistle-blowers and document-leakers punished for violating the presumed sanctity of the state secret.[6] And while we can build consensus around the notion that we must learn from the past in order to avoid repeating our forebears' errors, we spar openly over that past and, especially, over who should bear the blame for those errors. The adjudication of history has serious consequences, including the payment of reparations, the offering of official apologies following atrocities, the settlement of land claims, and the integrity of national identities. This means that our engagement with history, whether or not in a professional capacity, is always suffused with our own ideological inclinations, personal interests, and present-day political ends.

This is all the more true for those communities in which matters of historical interpretation have immediate real-world stakes, such as the Guatemalan activists whose lives and labor form the subject of this book. As E. P. Thompson once wrote, "Experience walks in without knocking at the door,

and announces deaths, crises of subsistence, trench warfare, unemployment, inflation, genocide. . . . In the face of such general experiences old conceptual systems may crumble and new problematics insist upon their presence."[7] In an unstable postwar Guatemala, the surprising appearance of the National Police archives presented all manner of new problematics, requiring new conceptual systems with which to confront them. Aging police and military officials implicated in war crimes walked free, enjoying impunity and ongoing political power, while the fates of thousands of citizens remained unknown. In such a context, the amateur historians exhuming this past had no choice but to get down to work, and the new conceptual system they developed for reckoning with the documents combined historical research, courtroom litigation, technical archival science, and impassioned advocacy. In the process, they set a model of political engagement with the past, one that channeled the spirit of an observation by anthropologist Michel-Rolph Trouillot: "No amount of historical research about the Holocaust and no amount of guilt about Germany's past can serve as a substitute for marching in the streets against German skinheads today."[8]

This book analyzes how the sudden reappearance of seventy-five million pages of once-secret police documents impacted the volatile Guatemalan political scene, bringing a historian's eye to bear upon how postwar activists use historical research and archives precisely as a way of marching in the streets today. During the peace process in the mid-1990s, then president Alvaro Arzú and his administration denied that any police archives existed. Arzú, defense minister Héctor Barrios Celada, and interior minister Rodolfo Mendoza stonewalled the United Nations–sponsored Historical Clarification Commission (CEH) charged with investigating the country's 1960–1996 civil war.[9] In theory, and according to the terms of the 1996 Peace Accords, the CEH had the right to access military and police records for its investigation. In practice, however, its petitions for access were summarily denied, and the CEH was forced to proceed without any documentation from the Guatemalan state.[10] The police archives, therefore, were a political bombshell, because while victims' families had long been armed with what Gloria Alberti terms "archives of pain"—the watchdog reports and testimonies of state violence amassed by human rights nongovernmental organizations and other nonstate actors—they had never before had large-scale access to "archives of terror," namely, the records used by state perpetrators.[11]

The archives' discovery renewed a national conversation about historical memory and transitional justice. It also provoked violent opposition from conservative sectors seeking to prevent the documents from coming to light.

Today, a foreign-funded activist initiative called the Project for the Recovery of the National Police Historical Archives (PRAHPN), hereafter "the Project," is rescuing the decaying records and analyzing their contents, with the aim of generating evidence to use in prosecuting war-era officials for crimes against humanity. Over time, the Project grew from its improvisational beginnings into a precedent-setting effort armed with hundreds of staff, state-of-the-art technology, and support from around the world.

It also operated from a position of political commitment; the Project's coordinator was a former guerrilla commander, and its work was animated by the goal of reframing the official narrative about the war—what Elizabeth Jelin has called the "master narrative of the nation"—that had been promoted for years by its victors.[12] This military-backed version of history held, not to put too fine a point on it, that state security forces heroically defended the fatherland from the evils of Soviet-sponsored communism. Lives lost along the way, the story went, were those of naive youngsters brainwashed by vulgar Marxism, who would have done better to stay at home (*se habían metido en algo*), or else of terrorists who deserved what they got and worse still. In this telling, if a high school student distributing leaflets for a leftist student group ended up as yet another defiled corpse with its tongue cut out and hands severed, dumped in a ravine or mass grave, the student had brought it upon herself. It tarred trade unionists, students, and peasant activists as traitors, deviants, and *vendepatrias* subservient to foreign ideologies.[13] But this interpretation could neither bury survivors' contradictory memories nor quell their expectations that a purportedly democratic state should offer at least an opportunity at justice. If the postwar project of building a democratic society where one had never existed was to succeed, this paean to the armed forces could no longer be its foundation myth.

In such a setting, the (re)writing of history *is* politics—politics with a definite sense of urgency, as statistical indicators unanimously warn that postwar Guatemala finds itself in an "emergency situation."[14] The country's major twenty-first-century preoccupations (inequality, violence, impunity, Maya disenfranchisement, out-migration) are driven by unresolved historical grievances: crimes not solved, socioeconomic disparities not redressed, power not redistributed, and perpetrators unprosecuted.[15] Only 2 or 3 percent of *all* crimes, political or common, are prosecuted at all.[16] And so history is lived as an open wound. Those who have plumbed its depths know all too well how *el delito de pensar* (the crime of thinking) invites punishment from those who would turn the page on the past and foreclose certain visions of the future.[17]

With the weak state scarcely able to protect its citizens' health and safety,

entrenched affinity groups—oligarchs, business elites, foreign agro-export and mineral extraction interests, and the military—have made the resulting power vacuum their own jealously guarded domain. The question today for reformers, and regional systems like the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, is: How to dislodge them?[18] The Guatemalan military explicitly conceived the country's mid-1980s transition to procedural democracy as a counter-insurgency strategy; wartime power structures were never dismantled. Newer human rights organizations struggled to carve out spaces for debate in a crippled postwar society that was democratic in little more than name.[19] After the accords, these organizations focused on chipping away at a deeply corrupt political system, with results ranging from unforeseen successes—for example, the hard-won conviction of Bishop Juan Gerardi's murderers—to, more commonly, disheartening failures, particularly in security reform.[20] Framed against such a bleak landscape, a forgotten warehouse filled with rotting administrative documents seems an unlikely motor for substantive change.

But as with all tools, the archives' utility derives entirely from the manner of their application. This book seeks to make sense of the archives' importance in both the past and the present, investigating how these documents acquired their power and how they are being reimagined in a very delicate postwar setting. Though the documentary collection is composed of one physical set of papers, those papers have at different historical moments represented two distinct *archival logics*—two organizing principles, or two reasons for being. The first logic was one of surveillance, social control, and ideological management, a Cold War–inflected logic that used archives as a weapon against enemies of the state. The second logic, emerging from the records' rescue, is one of democratic opening, historical memory, and the pursuit of justice for war crimes—again using archives as a weapon, but to very different ends. I analyze how the varied uses to which Guatemalans have put these records over time—the evolution from the first archival logic to the second—offer a narrative arc that maps onto the country's broader transition from war to an unstable peace.[21] (In so doing, I suggest that we must expand the conventional chronology by which we define the Cold War, because in various parts of Latin America, such as Chile and Argentina, electoral politics and judicial cultures remain strongly colored by that period's legacies.)

Trouillot writes that the word "history" has two vernacular, mutually dependent meanings: the first refers to the materiality of the sociohistorical process ("that which happened," or what historians write *about*); the second refers to the past, present, and future narratives that are produced about it ("that which is said to have happened," or what historians *write*).[22] In this

book, I explore these meanings and their interrelation. For example, did genocide happen in Guatemala—as the CEH and, in 2013, a Guatemalan court ruled—or is it only *said* to have happened? How would one go about proving it? Those accused of crimes against humanity have long argued that *no hubo genocidio*; as the website of Guatemala's Association of Military Veterans (AVEMILGUA) proclaims, "There are those who feel the need to manipulate history in order to justify their crimes and treasonously implicate those who prevented their terrorist plans from being realized. . . . They only disinform, and the truth will never change."[23] The police archives' reappearance, however, destabilized such confident claims. For the first time since formal peace was struck, human rights activists had access to abundant documentary evidence in the state's own hand, though they faced the risks of conflating "history" with a description of crimes and victims. In tracking how these activists made use of these documents—how they exhumed this mass grave filled with paper cadavers—this book not only details how the messy process of history-writing and rewriting functions but also makes an argument about why it matters.

THAT WHICH HAPPENED, OR, "*SÍ HUBO GENOCIDIO*"

Each year, the small town of Sumpango Sacatepéquez celebrates Day of the Dead with a festival of giant kites handmade from tissue paper and bamboo rods.[24] The round kites, the largest of which span an impressive six meters in diameter, are intricate works of art, labored over for months by all-male teams of community members late each night after their days in the field. From afar, the festival appears whimsical: the translucent kites' vivid colors shot through with sunlight, their tasseled edges ruffled by mountain breezes. Thousands of visitors crowd Sumpango's dusty soccer pitch, waiting for the climactic moment when all but the very grandest kites are taken down from their display mountings and flown. Each kite-building team sends its own opus aloft, with as many as five or six young men straining to control their creations with long ropes; the competition is fierce, but all in good fun. The beautiful kites are effectively destroyed in the process, half a year's work torn apart in a few delirious seconds. Once the prizes are handed out, the community celebrates with live music and cold Gallo beer.

The gaiety of the festival masks a dark obverse. Many of the kites appear brightly hued and merry at a distance, but upon closer inspection they depict detailed images of loss and suffering inspired by Mayan experiences of the war. "Guatemala weeps and struggles, searching for its peace," read one kite; it showed three generations of indigenous women standing in horror before three men's machete-slashed corpses whose raw tendons and bones lay ex-

posed. Another's imagery stretched back to the Conquest. Beneath a tableau of Spanish conquistadors torturing captured Mayan warriors and burning pages of hieroglyphic script, it read: "They burned our codices and killed our people, but the flame of our culture was not extinguished; it continues burning." Yet another bore images of four weeping women, each captioned: "Pain, Sorrow, Loneliness" framed the topmost woman's weathered face, and below the profiles to the left and the right appeared "Poverty, Insult, Mistreatment" and "Violence, Insecurity, Crime." But it was the 2007 festival's most visually stunning kite, a many-pointed star adorned with swirling licks of color and patterns evocative of the *alfombra* carpets lain during Guatemala's Easter Week, which featured the most arresting message. "To be born in this immense world filled with evil is simply to begin to die," it proclaimed above dramatic, Dalí-inspired renderings of winged demons hovering, spectral humans locked in a desperate embrace, and a bleeding world cleaved in twain. "Guatemala," the kite affirmed, "lives under the shadows of death."[25] (See fig. Intro1.)

Death and violence in Guatemala are more than artistic metaphors; they are daily realities that hover uncomfortably close to life. Historically, the country's salient features have been a dramatically unequal distribution of wealth, a semifeudal labor system in which elites forcibly conscripted indigenous peasants into debt peonage on farms producing goods for export, a profound anti-Indian racism (though the census still classifies more than half the population as "indigenous"), and a long tradition of dictatorship.[26] Popular protest and a general strike deposed the tyrant Jorge Ubico and brought, in 1944, a decade of political opening, free elections, and economic redistribution referred to as the Revolutionary Spring.[27] It was short-lived. In 1954, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), fearing the spread of Soviet-sponsored communism and wanting to protect U.S. economic interests, worked with revanchist local elites to oust the progressive reformist president, Jacobo Arbenz.[28] A new military dictator, Carlos Castillo Armas, was flown into Guatemala on a U.S. embassy airplane to take Arbenz's place, ushering in decades of antidemocratic rule. As U.S. assistance flowed into military and police coffers, unrest over successive regimes' crusades against not just the tiny Marxist left but also unions, universities, churches, peasant cooperatives, and journalists exploded into rebellion during the 1960s and 1970s.[29] Four insurgent groups—the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), the Revolutionary Organization of People in Arms (ORPA), and the Guatemalan Workers' Party (PGT)—attempted to mobilize first urban and then mass rural support for revolution against an increasingly murderous state.[30] They united in 1982 under the banner of the Guatemalan National Revolutionary

FIG. INTRO1 Kite from the Sumpango Sacatepéquez Day of the Dead festival in 2007. It reads, "Guatemala lives under the shadows of death. To be born in this immense world filled with evil is simply to begin to die." Photograph by author.

Unity (URNG).[31] These groups, and anyone deemed to be their allies—trade unionists, students, Mayas—were defined as "internal enemies" and became the targets of a coordinated counterinsurgency effort on the part of the military, police, and paramilitary death squads, with the country's elites using Cold War rhetoric to justify a full-spectrum campaign against any form of democratic opening.[32] When all was said and done, the army and police, fortified with foreign guns, technical expertise, and political cover, crushed the weak insurgency and killed or disappeared tens of thousands of civilians.[33] The terms of the Peace Accords, only halfheartedly and partially implemented, were a better reflection of the insurgency's near-total destruction than of the victors' will to enact change.[34]

The bloodbath in the highlands provoked outrage among observers, many of whom sought to contribute by documenting the crimes to which they bore witness.[35] Rigoberta Menchú's testimonial memoir, as well as many hundreds of reports by human rights organizations both inside and outside of Guatemala, sought not only to publicize rural violence but to stop it from continuing. Mindful of ongoing repression within the country and the heat of Cold War anticommunism in the international sphere, these early reports neces-

sarily minimized guerrilla and militant politics in order to make the more immediately pressing case about crimes against humanity; the narrative was simplified, stripped to the heart of the matter (army violence against unaffiliated Maya civilians), and framed to make the maximum possible impact upon the U.S. Congress, interested world citizens, and foreign governments. This version of the story, one so appalling that it stuck in the minds of people around the world, was an important political tool. Moreover, it was true, and it was substantiated over time by a wealth of forensic and testimonial evidence.[36]

It was not, however, the entire story. Not only did it tend to collapse the complexity of the war into a single type of victim (Maya), a single perpetrator (the military), and a single theater (the countryside), it stripped the dead of agency.[37] In the postwar period, it produced the ahistorical suggestion that, as Carlota McAllister writes, "to be counted as victims of the war, Maya had to be innocent not only of any crime but also of any political agenda."[38] Scholars and researchers both foreign and local have since amply deepened and expanded our understandings of this complex conflict, but the sound-bite version of the war tends, still, to reflect just a few takeaway points: genocidal military, apolitical Mayas, rural massacres.[39]

This study has a different focus. The institutional perpetrator explored here is the National Police—a wartime actor so understudied that mention of it barely even appears in most accounts—and the theater of conflict examined, both in wartime and in peacetime, is Guatemala City.[40] Founded in 1881 by liberal dictator Justo Rufino Barrios, the PN tied existing bands of urban gendarmes and rural night watchmen into a more cohesive corps that, alongside the military, defended the interests of private capital. Two of its early directors were U.S. citizens—José H. Pratt of the New York Police Department and Gustavo Joseph of the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Police Force—who, foreshadowing the 1950s, were brought in to help with professionalization and training. The historical record's silence on the PN can be partly explained by several factors: first, of course, that there were no police records available for would-be researchers to use until 2005; second, the common understanding that the counterinsurgency's primary architects and executors were the military, not the police. The first factor contributed directly to the perception of the second; while the military was indeed decisively in charge, the police were still involved in many of the conflict's defining crimes, which Guatemalans knew well at the time. Third, the emergence of the Maya movement over the course of the 1980s and 1990s stimulated interest in writing about the Maya experience of the war, and indeed, Mayas—including politically mobilized

Mayas, as Carlota McAllister, Betsy Konefal, and others have shown—made up a majority of the war's dead, raped, and displaced.[41] This led researchers to the rural areas where the military's massacres were concentrated, away from the urban centers that were the police's main theater of operations.

There is also a fourth factor, one that brings us back to the political nature of historical interpretation. The war in Guatemala City involved a different kind of violence—a surgical, targeted repression against specific sectors of civil society and popular movements—and often, consequently, a different kind of victim. Many of the forty-five thousand Guatemalans who disappeared during the war had lived and agitated in the capital city. They were trade unionists, schoolteachers, antipoverty campaigners, labor lawyers, radical students, Communist Party members, reformist politicians, liberation theology–influenced clergy, organizers and fund-raisers for the insurgency, and yes, in not a few cases, armed insurgents themselves.[42] The urban counterinsurgency, which featured heavy National Police participation, inflicted disproportionate repression upon thousands of city dwellers whose only crime was to be a student, a union member, or a victim's family member searching for her lost sister or son. It also, however, pursued sectors of society radicalized into fighting and fighting back, self-consciously and passionately, for revolution. Urban insurgents blew up police stations and supply convoys, assassinated police and military officials, and carried out high-profile kidnappings to draw attention to their cause and—they hoped—destabilize the state. Popular movement activists, organized in labor and student federations, decried the escalation of state repression and called openly for regime change. They died for it, and they should not have. They were well aware, however, that they might, and they knew that their police files would grow thicker with each passing day of their foreshortened lives. Around the University of San Carlos in the early 1980s, student leaders would half-jestingly ask each other, "*¿A quién le toca mañana*?" (Whose turn will it be [to die] tomorrow?). It was an admission that they knew what they were getting into, believed in what they stood for, and, for better or worse, were willing to become martyrs to their cause.[43]

The war's victims were not only, we now know, apolitical cannon fodder, nor was the U.S.-backed military the only agent of repression, nor did the entire conflict unfold in the *altiplano*. Yet these other components of the story have been comparatively little told in the war's aftermath, leaving us with a peculiar paradox: though the police's counterinsurgent role and the importance of the war's urban stages were well understood at the time—as documented in press and popular movement reports—both of these dynamics have largely disappeared from subsequent accounts. The discovery of the PN

archives therefore promises a wealth of opportunities for new analyses and understandings—about the police's responsibility for war crimes, about urban social movements, about the geography of insurgency, about the institutional and social history of the police and its agents, about changing conceptions of crime and criminality over time, and more. Also, because of the toll taken by forced disappearance in Guatemala City, hopes run high, perhaps dangerously so, that the archives will help bereaved family members to learn what became of their loved ones, and to prosecute those responsible.

As the records are cleaned, reordered, and digitized—as of January 2013, some fifteen million pages of the total seventy-five million had been thus preserved—these and other stories will be written and rewritten. The Project's publication of a hard-hitting investigative report, *Del silencio a la memoria*, in 2011 represented an important first thrust. Other voices from the archives are emerging in various forms, including undergraduate theses written by young Guatemalans interested in excavating their country's past. By working toward the passage of a new national archives system law, building new diploma programs in archival science and human rights at the national university, sharing its technical means and expertise with other arms of government and NGOs seeking to preserve their own records, and collaborating on standing war crimes cases, the Project has argued for archives to occupy a new and different role in national culture—and, hence, for a different and slightly more equitable relationship between citizens and the state. By changing the way Guatemala archived, the Project sought to change the way Guatemalans lived.[44]

It is this trajectory of continuity and change that I have sought to document. Consequently, although this work treats the PN's structural history and the war in Guatemala City at significant length, it does not purport to be a complete social history of the police. Rather, I use the archives as a conceptual bridge with which to connect two very different periods of political ferment: the armed conflict, and the attempts to grapple with its legacies. As mentioned earlier, the PN archives have at different times represented two distinct archival logics, one of wartime social control and the other of postwar truth claims and democratic opening. The historical evolution of the first logic into the next parallels the transition from formal conflict to contractual peace (*paz pactada*). I therefore tell the history of the archives as a way of telling the history of the war, and I conduct an ethnography of the archives and the Project as a way of narrating the importance of this history in peacetime. In tracking how the very same raw documents, the police archives, engendered the production of very different historical narratives, I expose the interdependence of history's two meanings: *that which happened* and *that which is said to have hap-*

pened. In this case, what connects them is the archives. In every case, archives form stunning articulations of power and knowledge, which must be teased apart if we are to understand the stories we tell ourselves about the past.

ARCHIVAL THINKING

To put the archives at the center of my work and to consider them as a unit of analysis unto themselves rather than as a simple repository of historical source material, I had to learn how to think archivally. Archival thinking, as I define it, has a dual meaning: first, it is a method of historical analysis, and second, it is a frame for political analysis.[45] These correspond to the dual meanings of the word "archives" itself: the first denotes collections of objects, often but not exclusively documents, analyzed for their content; the second refers to the politicized and contingent state institutions that house said documents.

On the historical side, archival thinking requires us to look past the words on a document's page to examine the conditions of that document's production: how it came to exist, what it was used for, what its form reveals, and what sorts of state knowledge and action it both reflected and engendered. On the political side, archival thinking demands that we see archives not only as sources of data to be mined by researchers but also as more than the sum of their parts—as instruments of political action, implements of state formation ("technologies of rule"), institutions of liberal democratization, enablers of gaze and desire, and sites of social struggle.[46] Why a particular document was created *and* why it was grouped with other documents and kept in order to constitute an "archives" are mutually dependent questions. Any archive contains far less than it excludes, as archivists know, and every archive has its own history—one that conditions the ability to interact with it, write from it, and understand the larger systems of power, control, and legibility that record keeping necessarily enables.[47] The Enlightenment notions undergirding the concept of state archives, as both *a part of* and *apart from* modern societies, represent these institutions as neutral storehouses of foundational documents.[48] In practice, however, the politics of how archives are compiled, created, and opened are intimately tied to the politics and practices of governance, and are themselves historical in a way that transcends the content written on their documents' pages. This is especially so in settings where the "terror archives" of deposed regimes are reconceived as technologies of justice and/or components of state (re-)formation. In order to think archivally, then, we must place archives—with their histories, their contingencies, their silences and gaps, and their politics—at the heart of our research questions rather than simply relegating them to footnotes and parentheses.

This work does so by taking the PN archives as its central site of analysis, examining three different types of work done by the archives at the state, civil society, and individual levels. At the level of government, these records—like the military's records, a prize long fought for by activists—were tools of counterinsurgent state formation, rendering legible those sectors of society deemed to be enemies of the state in order to enable their elimination. Policing is, in its most basic sense, a process by which a state builds an archive of society. The work of policing—think, for example, of the criminal background check—would be impossible without the archival tools of fingerprint databases, arrest logs, and categories of circumscribed behavior. Hitched to Cold War objectives and local elites' efforts to shut down socioeconomic change, however, the oppressive power of police records assumed an intensified character. By producing a massive documentary record about Guatemala and Guatemalans, the National Police corps was transformed—with U.S. assistance in matters archival, technical, political, and material—into the shock troops of the hemisphere's most brutal counterinsurgency.

At the civil society level, the records' current incarnation as the objects of a revisionist recovery initiative makes them a space in which battered progressive sectors attempt both to reconstitute and construct themselves anew through archival practice. Increasingly, human rights activists have come to phrase their demands upon the state in archival terms: to obtain documentary access means to obtain truth, and to obtain truth means to obtain justice. Therefore, documentary access becomes equated with justice, even if the reality remains more complicated. There is no simple equation wherein more documents equals more truth, or more truth commissions mean more justice, and though these propositions ring true for a reason, critiques of audit culture suggest that the declassification of former repressive regimes' records serves ill as a mere barometer of state transparency or democratization.[49] I pursue a thornier question with this case study: What does the way a society grapples with an archive like this—the way it puts history to work—tell us about that society, its "peace process," the nature of its institutions, and the fabric of its relationships between citizens and state?

Finally, at the individual level, the police archives exert power over the subjectivities of all who come into contact with them. They offer up the ever-elusive promise of "revealing the truth" about the war's dynamics even as the archive's sheer dimension creates a totalizing illusion of counterinsurgent omnipotence, changing and reorganizing survivors' memories of their own political participation. As fetishes of the state, they generate desire for the forbidden state secret, whether a historian's craving for virgin documenta-

tion or a survivor's urgent need to learn how his sister died. But although we often assume a correlation between archived documents and historical facts, the police records, like those of any institution, are imperfect, incomplete, and riddled with misapprehensions and errors. They cannot align with survivors' memories of the war, owing to questions of perspective and the passage of time.

It is important to remember that at all three levels, the memory work represented by the police archives' rescue is more about knowledge *production* than it is about knowledge's recovery. At all three levels, the archives act—generating archival subjects, historical narratives, and state practices. I hope that this book's position in the interstitial space between history and anthropology, and its development of the concept of archival thinking, will encourage historians to think more ethnographically—and anthropologists to think more historically—about archives.

In the Guatemalan case, the conditions and contingencies of how these archives came to be *both* an implement of wartime social control *and* a site of postconflict empowerment tell us much not only about the country's history but more broadly about the conduct of the Cold War in Latin America. As the United States initiated police assistance programs in countries seen as potential "dominoes," its advisers in Guatemala focused specifically on security forces' need to improve their archival surveillance methods, enabling them to more effectively eradicate "subversion."[50] As Stoler reminds us, "Filing systems and disciplined writing produce assemblages of control and specific methods of domination."[51] And yet, the role of archival practice in the militarization of modern regimes is rarely considered by scholars, despite a raft of excellent studies on the uses of archives for social control in various colonial administrations.[52] This study argues for the integration of archives and archival surveillance into the pantheon of more obvious tools of international Cold War political influence. After all, the work of containment was not only carried out with guns, helicopters, and development programs: it was also carried out with three-by-five-inch index cards, filing cabinets, and training in records management. Archives, in Guatemala and elsewhere, were another front in the global Cold War.

This examination of archives' counterinsurgent uses also provides insight into postconflict transitions and societies' efforts to reckon with civil war's corrosive legacies. It demonstrates how a society's "archival culture"—the attitudes it fosters about archival access, and how citizens can conceive of putting information to use—is a revelatory indicator of the relationship between state and society, one that changes over time. Put simply, we can discern a lot about

a society, particularly a postwar society, by looking at how that society treats its archives. As cultural theorist Jacques Derrida writes, "There is no political power without control of the archive, if not memory. Effective democratization can always be measured by this essential criterion: the participation in and access to the archive, its constitution, and its interpretation."[53] Accordingly, I use archival thinking to explore both the technologies of political repression and the practices of social reconstruction being deployed by survivors working to marshal the same body of records for different ends.

Guatemalans' practices of postwar social reconstruction have been multifarious; the rescue of the PN archives is simply a bright and recent star in a larger constellation of initiatives. As Mario Castañeda writes, "Memory is actualized in struggle, in rebellion, in the negation of our society's status quo," a notion that has produced enduring battles referred to by one activist group as a "memory offensive."[54] "Memory," here, is defined not as passive or recuperative but as active and engaged. The memory offensive has taken forms as diverse as *escrache*-style public denunciations of ex-generals; research projects on social movement history; efforts at criminal prosecution; raising public awareness through historical education; demonstrations and counterdemonstrations (for example, the annual protest march every 30 June, attempting to rebrand Army Day); exhumations of mass graves and inhumations of identified remains; the building of local museums and memorials; and ongoing work to combat corporate mineral extraction on Maya community land and oppose drug war–related rural remilitarization.[55] Within this array of practices, however, certain moments stand out as landmarks: the release of the Archbishop's Office on Human Rights report *Guatemala: Never Again!* in 1998; the publication of the CEH report in 1999; the leak of a high-impact army dossier dubbed the "Death-Squad Diary," or Diario Militar, in 1999; and, I submit here, the rescue of the National Police archives.[56] This book explores how the Project fit into this broader memoryscape, drew strength from previous initiatives, and laid the groundwork for subsequent advances.

This book is thus far the only one documenting the process by which terror archives are recovered, but this line of inquiry has regional and global resonance. As Louis Bickford wrote a decade ago, "An emphasis on archival preservation is often not explicitly highlighted as a key ingredient to deepening democracy and the long-term vibrancy of democratic practices in countries that have experienced traumatic pasts."[57] In recent years, however, an emphasis on preserving and declassifying archives documenting human rights abuses—and archives in general—has increasingly been folded into postauthoritarian strategies that previously focused more on lustration, the building of monu-

ments, or securing apologies, though much distance remains to be covered. In virtually every country of Central and Eastern Europe, including the former East Germany, Serbia, Romania, and the former Czechoslovakia, political change impelled popular demands for access to secret police records, and Germany's decision to open the Ministry for State Security, or Stasi, archives after reunification was influential.[58] In 1997, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights adopted the Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity. They included five principles on the "preservation of and access to archives bearing witness to violations," developed by jurists Louis Joinet and Diane Orentlicher, which established norms for victims', prosecutors', defendants', and researchers' access to archives containing information about human rights abuses.[59]

Latin American countries have now taken the Joinet-Orentlicher principles and run with them. In 1992, Paraguay's "Terror Archives"—the records of its secret police during the Stroessner dictatorship—were discovered, processed, and used in the country's truth commission.[60] (In 2009 they were integrated into the Memory of the World archival register of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization [UNESCO], which as of that same year also included Cambodia's Khmer Rouge records, collected by the Documentation Center of Cambodia and made accessible to researchers at the Tuol Sleng genocide museum in Phnom Penh.)[61] In 2008 in Uruguay, President Tabaré Vázquez created the National Archives of Remembrance to make accessible records from more than a decade of military rule.[62] In Brazil in 2009, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva ordered the creation of the website "Memories Revealed," where his administration published declassified army records from the country's twenty-year dictatorship.[63] In January 2010, Argentina ordered the declassification of military records from its Dirty War and reversed its amnesty law for army officials.[64] Also in 2010, Chile's Michelle Bachelet inaugurated the Memory Museum; it features a large library documenting the years of the dictatorship, during which Bachelet herself was tortured.[65]

Beyond the Americas, Spanish president José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero passed a decree in 2008, part of his Historical Memory Laws, allowing Franco victims to retrieve documents about their families from the Spanish Civil War archives.[66] Farther east, the Iraq Memory Foundation today works to compile and preserve documentation from the long years of Ba'athist repression. (Its efforts are complicated by the fact that the U.S. military seized great quantities of Hussein-era intelligence files upon occupying Baghdad, and more were destroyed in the fighting.)[67] These many recent examples are interrelated,

as nations at different stages of postconflict reckoning use each other's best and worst practices as models for their own approaches, with assistance from transnational networks of human rights NGOs.[68] In the wake of the Arab Spring, activists in Tunisia and Egypt, too, moved to secure the archives of fallen regimes with an eye toward their future use. One journalist reported from Tunis that an "unassuming whitewashed building . . . [is] crammed full of explosive material potentially more damaging, or vital, to Tunisia's democratic experiment than any incendiary device. The structure is not an armory packed with weapons. It houses the long-secret archives of the country's once-dreaded Interior Ministry."[69]

In the Guatemalan case, the National Police archives are a microcosm of the country's larger postwar dynamics: their existence denied, their rediscovery accidental, their future uncertain due to the threats faced by "human rights" initiatives in the country, their rescue initially completely ad hoc in the absence of government capacity or political will to exercise its constitutional responsibility over them, their processing funded entirely from abroad. The conditions of the police records in 2005 offered a sobering snapshot of the "peacetime" landscape; their recovery has provided another, capturing the incremental, hard-fought nature of political change on the ground. The archives' double nature thus reflects the tremendous tension of post–Peace Accords Guatemala. On the one hand, as Guatemalans know well, there has been so little substantive change; on the other hand, the very existence of the archival recovery initiative, however beset by challenges it has been, testifies to how much political opening *has* been achieved. As one activist commented to me, "Even ten years ago, they would have killed all the people working in a project like that."[70]

It is partly for this reason that archivist Eric Ketelaar likens archives to both temples and prisons. "In all totalitarian systems—public and private—records are used as instruments of power, of extreme surveillance, oppression, torture, murder," he writes. "The records themselves are dumb, but without them the oppressor is powerless." Following Foucault, he suggests that the panoptical archive of a terror state serves a carceral purpose, imprisoning society by making it known that the state is always watching and always filing; but, he notes, "paradoxically, the same records can also become instruments of empowerment and liberation, salvation and freedom"—they can serve as temples, as "safe havens," once the terror state falls.[71] This has certainly been the case in the post facto repurposing of the terror archives kept by, for example, the Nazis, the Stasi, the Khmer Rouge, or the KGB. However, close ethnographic attention to the process by which that repurposing takes place reveals the temples/

prisons dyad to be less black-and-white than we might wish. To be able to resurrect a paper cadaver in postwar Guatemala—to learn what became of a *desaparecido*, or identify a *desaparecido*'s remains, or write and reveal new histories—is a gift of inestimable value, a temple's treasure indeed. But for all that, what is rescued remains a paper cadaver, not a citizen: a testament to the repression suffered by that citizen, a thin and tragic representation of a once-full life, and a less-than-liberatory reminder that the military state succeeded in forcing social struggle off the shop floors and university campuses, down from the mountains, and into the filing cabinets. To walk the halls of a state's prison-turned-temple is a worthy goal for any citizenry; however, the salvation and freedom thus offered can necessarily only be partial, for the deeds chronicled in the archives have already taken place. The right to truth is critically important, but not more so than the violated right to life.

The National Police archives, we shall see, have many stories to tell, and most are not expressly written on its documents' pages. They are stories of politics, of collective action, of painful separations and reunions, of sacrifices made, of states and of people, of resistance and silencing and loss, of survival. Those engaged in trying to tell such stories carry out their historical work with the goal of a more democratic contemporary politics, and even the most impassioned advocates of a process referred to in Guatemala as "the recovery of historical memory" know that their efforts at rewriting history look more to the future than to the past. As Walter Benjamin has written, "To articulate what is past does not mean to recognize 'how it really was.' It means to take control of a memory, as it flashes in a moment of danger."[72] Historical memory cannot be "recovered" like data in a computer file; by its very nature, memory is a shape-shifter, morphing once an analytical gaze is brought to bear upon it.[73] Instead, memory's recovery is, fundamentally, about power. In this case, engaging the politics of memory is a way for a battered activist sector to articulate archival truth claims, seek reparations both material and symbolic, and reconstruct itself as the country's political conscience.[74] History and memory allow for the *reivindicación* (redemption) of the war's victims and the remaking of its survivors, both essential if Guatemala is to have any hope of building a more just society.

METHODOLOGY

In writing this book, my goals were twofold: first, to participate in the collaborative initiative of revealing new histories of repression and resistance, and second, to trace and analyze the process by which Guatemalans themselves made sense of the police records, their memories, their postconflict lives, and

their visions for an uncertain future. When I began this work, it was not at all clear that I would emerge with anything. The first week I arrived to do preliminary research as a Project volunteer, in April 2006, unknown individuals threw a Molotov cocktail into the archives site under cover of darkness, making both front-page headlines and the point that the documents' survival was hardly guaranteed (see fig. Intro2). A few months later, a group of uniformed army generals marched into the PDH, demanding that the Project's director be fired and that they be given access to the Project's personnel information. These were the sorts of hazards one expected, and they underscored activists' fears that their archival rescue effort would be shut down for political reasons. But other threats to the archives' safety came as surprises. In February 2007, a hundred-foot-deep sinkhole, resembling the crater an asteroid might pound into the earth, tore open Guatemala City's Zone 6. The result of poor plumbing infrastructure, the yawning sinkhole just around the corner from the archives devoured an entire city block and several area residents overnight. It could easily have taken the precious police papers along with it. Despite the uncertain outcome, I soldiered on, as we all do when we believe in the importance of the task.

To reconstruct the U.S. role in producing a counterinsurgent National Police, with attention to the role of archival production, I used records from the State Department, the Department of Defense, the CIA, the National Security Agency, the National Security Council, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), particularly its Office of Public Safety. It bears highlighting that many of the records pertaining to this period and area of inquiry remain significantly redacted or classified altogether, underscoring the fact that state secrecy and hermetism where information is concerned are hardly the sole purview of the global South—as Chelsea Manning and the protagonists of Wikileaks, among others, might well attest if they were not in hiding or in prison. On the war more generally, I consulted long runs of Guatemalan newspapers; military and police publications; insurgents' communiqués and internal correspondence; student pamphlets and publications; guerrilla memoirs and testimonies; presidential speeches and radio addresses; Inter-American Court on Human Rights cases; reports from watchdog organizations like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International; foreign police training manuals; and more. I complemented this documentary research with perspectives and memories shared by the older workers at the archival recovery project.

Much of my research was ethnographic as well, involving extended participant observation and interviews both formal and informal. I accompanied the Project as a volunteer worker, observer, translator, and colleague from

La Hora

Fundado en 1920

"TRIBUNA, NO MOSTRADOR", Clemente Marroquín Rojas

DECANO DE LA PRENSA INDEPENDIENTE

Época IV | Guatemala de la Asunción, jueves 11 de mayo de 2006 | Número 29,102

Tratan de quemar archivos policiales

Lanzan cocteles molotov y ardieron vehiculos; PDH exige investigación del atentado 7

NACIONAL

Vicepresidente

FIG. INTRO2 Early Molotov cocktail attacks at the police archives made front-page headlines. *La Hora*, 11 May 2006.

the spring of 2006 onward. Before doing my own formal research, I worked full-time for six months (May–July 2006 and June–August 2007) as a Project volunteer, the only foreigner to work as an everyday, rank-and-file member of the team. For the first stint, I worked on a historical analysis team generating preliminary reports on the PN's clandestine and semiclandestine units and death squads, including Commando Six (Comando Seis) and the Special Operations Reaction Brigade (BROE). For the second, I was a member of the team processing the records of the Joint Operations Center (Centro de Operaciones Conjuntas), the entity serving as the primary conduit for police-military communications. During these months on staff, I was able to experience for myself the range of emotions engendered by this painstaking work: the pride and excitement of finding a document of real importance, the anger and sadness provoked by nonstop reading about violence and vice, the boredom and frustration of long days spent sifting through bureaucratic minutiae. It was only after this initial phase, which also included a shorter visit in January 2007 and volunteer work on a compilation of declassified U.S. documents sent to the Project by the National Security Archive that same year, that I began conducting my own research, mostly during the 2007–2008 academic year when I lived in Guatemala City. I thus became, in a sense, a tiny

part of the story. My early contributions to the historical analysis team were mixed into the basic building blocks of the Project's eventual, and much more substantial, public report on its findings. As a translator, I mediated a number of the interactions between international technical advisers and Project staff from 2006 to 2008. Most memorably, in one interview I conducted outside the Project I received an off-the-record tip about a warehouse full of forgotten police records in the town of Puerto Barrios. Passing the tip along led to the recovery and incorporation of thousands more documents into the archives (though not before a suspicious arson incident nearly derailed the process). Finally, of course, I am also part of the surge of international interest in the Project, placing me among a cohort whose commitment to assisting the Project carried its own imperial baggage and transnational power dynamics, key elements of the story too.

In addition to the archival research mentioned previously, I conducted dozens of interviews with the Project's workers and the figures involved in its orbit—in government, the diplomatic corps, and the human rights sector—and I took part in the Project's everyday life for a year and a half, watching it evolve and struggle and grow. This allowed me to observe the process of reconstituting the archives, work that expanded Project staffers' political consciousnesses and senses of themselves as political actors, contributors to a larger democratizing initiative, and opponents of an official history that had marginalized and criminalized popular agency. Many Project *compañeros* and *compañeras* had high hopes for the archives. They also struggled, however, with what Jelin calls "the labors of memory"—the active, demanding work of managing resurgent traumas, psychological burdens, and memories stirred by sorting through the archives, reading about violence for eight hours daily, and finding loved ones' names or photographs.[75] My interviews with Project workers took place all over the city, in bars and cafés and shopping malls and private homes, but I conducted the majority of them at the archives—a challenging environment for many reasons, not least of which being that it remains an active police base. The sounds of gunshots from the adjacent police firing range or barking dogs from the nearby canine unit are heard throughout my recordings, yet another testament to the tensions of the Project's workplace. There are pauses in the tapes, or moments of hushed whispering, when interviewees would see an officer walk by or thought one was within earshot. The interviews were thus conditioned by the same sense of unease and instability pervading both everyday life in Guatemala City and these amateur historians' particular line of work. As such, I have protected their identities; individuals are identified in the text by pseudonyms and in the notes by interview code number.

While I have had the privilege of reading, both as a volunteer and in subsequent visits, many thousands of documents from the PN archives, my work here does not involve engaging the archives as a historian customarily might. I wanted to document the *process*, not to process the *documents*. This was why the Project gave me such unparalleled access to its work and workers so early on, in the spring of 2006. I was allowed to join the team precisely—and only—because its leaders believed that it could help to have an on-site foreign observer present to document its efforts, and because I offered to work at the service of the Guatemalans' priorities before following my own. Had I asked for research access in 2006, or 2007, or 2008, I would have been denied (as others were), with good reason. Aside from the fact that the archives' state of disorder at that time made traditional historical research impossible, the Project was operating with a very low profile, hoping to avoid the release of any information that could provoke retaliatory attacks. At that point, even family members of the dead and disappeared were being refused access to the records; it was not a queue I was interested in jumping. As a result, all staffers, myself included, signed confidentiality agreements promising not to divulge anything about the documents' contents.[76] (Access has subsequently been opened to the approximately fifteen million documents that have been digitized; many historical studies will emerge from that body of documentation in the not-too-distant future.)

I constantly struggled with the challenge of making my research useful to the Guatemalans who had extended me such trust. "We need to have a high international profile, so that nobody can come and shut us down for knowing too much," one Project worker told me.[77] I hope I have repaid their faith in some small sense not only by honoring the confidentiality agreement I was asked to sign (which is to say, I have not quoted from documents I saw while the agreement was in effect, though I do use documents subsequently made public), but by writing a book that argues strenuously for both the historical and the contemporary relevance of their work. My central preoccupation was to make the case for this history's importance, and by extension for the importance of historical and archival knowledge to the conduct of contemporary politics. I wanted to trace the remaking of these archives from the ground up because I knew instinctively that once that process concluded, its messiness and complexity would forever be lost as the archives were transformed into an institution, a success story—considered a fait accompli, like so many of the other archives that historians visit. We would have a new historical narrative about the war—the one being generated by the archive's rescuers—but no account of the process by which that narrative was produced or of those actors'

stake in it, and hence no sense of the powerful relationship between the two types of history.

STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION

In keeping with the dialectical structure outlined here, whereby I explore the tension between the two archival logics applied to the National Police documents over time, this study introduces the circumstances of the archives' discovery, closely examines both logics, and then turns to the synthesis produced over time by their opposition. The book is structured in four parts: "Explosions at the Archives" (chapters 1 through 3), "Archives and Counterinsurgency in Cold War Guatemala" (chapters 4 and 5), "Archives and Social Reconstruction in Postwar Guatemala" (chapters 6 and 7), and "Pasts Present and the Future Imperfect" (chapters 8 and 9).

Chapter 1 narrates the early days of the archives' reappearance, charting the beginnings of the rescue initiative and the Project's evolving ideas about how to build new knowledge about the armed conflict and the police's role in it. It shows how this process was microcosmic of larger questions about war and postwar political struggle. Chapter 2 demonstrates that rather than being a stroke of random luck, the discovery and marshaling of the PN archives were instead the culmination of decades of activism over access to state security records. These "archive wars," as I term them, established important precedents that informed how the PN archives would be put to use, and I outline the trajectory of the archive wars while also assessing the role of archival access in authoritarian societies. Chapter 3 returns to the Project, narrating its conversion from an ad hoc, scrappy effort into the professionalized and more stable initiative it would become. It attempts to answer the "million-dollar question" of why the archives were never destroyed by authorities while they had the chance.

Chapters 4 and 5 form a pair: by stepping back in time to analyze the role of the police and their archives in the conduct of the counterinsurgency, they show how the PN records acquired their power. (As the archivists at the Project quickly learned, one must understand the police's structural history in order to interpret the documents.) Chapter 4 reaches back to a decisive moment in the history of the PN: the 1954 overthrow of Arbenz and the subsequent initiation of a large-scale U.S. assistance program that converted the PN from a ramshackle assortment of thugs into a professionalized counterinsurgency apparatus. It examines the construction and use of the police archives historically, arguing that archival technologies were essential components of the state's campaign against civil unrest. Chapter 5 continues the story of the PN

past the termination of direct U.S. police aid in 1974, arguing that the dramatic failure of security reform in the postwar era is a function of the PN's own institutional history. It traces the structural genealogy of the PN's militarized, semi-official wings, demonstrating how these structures were never dismantled and today continue to participate in extralegal activities like social cleansings and politically motivated executions. It introduces the term "post-peace" to describe Guatemala's unstable, violent postwar status quo.

Chapters 6 and 7 also form a pair, ethnographically following the experiences of the workers at the archival recovery project. Chapter 6, which focuses on the experiences of older-generation leftists working at the Project, argues that these veterans have played an instrumental role in the production of new narratives about the conflict's history. It also explores how working in the archives has impacted these survivors' subjectivities, generating new opportunities for social reconstruction and reckoning while reopening old wounds. Chapter 7 examines the experiences of the younger workers at the Project, a large group of under-thirty individuals who lived the war as children and who today bridge the conflict and postconflict eras. It shows how their time at the archives shaped their emerging senses of self, transforming some of them into lifelong activists. It argues that among the archives' greatest impacts on Guatemala may prove to be the *formación* of more than one hundred politically conscious youth leaders committed not only to postwar justice but also to privileging archival preservation and historical reconstruction in their visions for the future.

The final two chapters discuss other archival recovery initiatives, international collaborations, legal advances, and educational endeavors sparked by the Project. Chapter 8 looks at the ontological shift undergone by the police archives since 2005: from a ragtag project in the process of *becoming* a usable archive, through a dangerous historical moment in which the Project was nearly destroyed altogether, into the established Historical Archive for the National Police—an institutionalized state of *being*. It examines what that shift both promised and portended for national politics. Chapter 9 discusses the landmark legal advances from 2010 on to which the police archives contributed; exceptions that prove the rule, these successful few cases and the herculean efforts to secure them suggest that a fuller reckoning with Guatemala's history will be hard-won. The charged debates surrounding these legal cases speak to the connections between a society's archival culture, its engagement with historical knowledge, and its political conditions. They demonstrate both the possibilities and the limitations of archival thinking.

As one Project worker once told me, "Human beings need to write their

own histories."[78] This book defends that proposition, while demonstrating that in delicate postconflict settings where the politics of history remain deadly serious, the act of doing so represents personal risk, collective courage, and, above all, a tremendous amount of labor. Project workers have worked, admirably and against the odds, to resurrect their country's paper cadavers in the hope of charting a new path forward. I wrote this book in the service of that larger aspiration: to resurrect lost archives, lost narratives, and, however abstractly, lost lives.

FOUR

BUILDING COUNTERINSURGENCY ARCHIVES

We have, of course, no desire to interfere in the internal affairs of Guatemala.

—U.S. secretary of state William Pierce Rogers, 1971

Soon after Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas flew into Guatemala City on a U.S. embassy plane to oust President Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán, the strongman sought technical support from his American friends in intelligence-gathering and countersubversion tactics.[1] Since the 1954 coup, Castillo Armas had busied himself by cutting a deep swath through Guatemala's democratic Left using a ramshackle assortment of rival security services, and he was keen to rationalize his crusade. In response, the International Cooperation Administration (ICA), USAID's predecessor, sent a consultant, Fred G. Fimbres, to assess the capacities and deficiencies of the National Police with an eye toward designing a U.S. assistance program. Fimbres's report noted his counterparts' "almost neurotic hypersensitiveness to communist activity and threatened attack," chronicling the areas in which local law enforcement did not pass muster: vehicle maintenance, radio communications, interagency coordination, disaster readiness—any and all routine functions not immediately related to the apprehension of suspected communists.[2] This subordination of civilian policing to partisan political terror did not, in and of itself, trouble Fimbres; the very purpose of his visit was to evaluate how the United States could assist in controlling "subversion" in the post-coup period. Fimbres's concern, rather, was that the PN's sagging infrastructure, organizational inefficiencies, and budgetary constraints might limit U.S. allies' ability to clean house in Arbenz's wake.

In his report, Fimbres made special mention of the sorry state of the PN's general filing and records system.[3] At PN stations, he observed "piles of documents, files, etc. dumped on the floor"; others were heaped in crude bundles or "arranged somewhat" on the floor, amounting to a central records unit he

deemed "hopelessly inadequate," falling "far short of its most treasured and prized objective—that of [being] an aid to the law enforcement function and investigative process."[4] Fimbres's gut assessment of the importance of record keeping was dead-on. He criticized the archival practices of the amateurish PN general staff, but when evaluating the Section for Defense against Communism, an elite intelligence unit that "secure[d] evidence in subversive matters," Fimbres noted that its archives and record control were "most excellent," the result of a provision in Castillo Armas's Preventive Penal Law against Communism (1954) that required the section to keep files on individuals linked to "communist" groups or activities.[5] Fimbres's observation implied a connection between effective record keeping and effective social control, a connection lost neither on his successors at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) nor on their Guatemalan pupils. Record keeping, and the surveillance of "enemies of the state" that good archival practice permitted, would prove indispensable.

In his recommendations, Fimbres advised that U.S. assistance focus specifically on records management, both by providing training—he suggested offering courses in "Police Records," "Police Property Records and Control," and "Police Records and Report Writing"—and by supplying raw materials like filing cabinets and file cards.[6] To build a modern, effective police force, the Guatemalans would need to learn how to build modern, effective archives. As U.S. support for the police and military expanded over the course of the Cold War, the question of record keeping remained in play, with the Americans ever mindful of how Guatemalan security forces "could improve their operation through the use of records."[7] Once Fimbres submitted his report, U.S. technicians began conducting daily classes in records management for PN agents, installed cabinets for safe document storage, and implemented a property registry so that the PN could keep track of weapons and matériel—the stockpiles of which ballooned as AID shipments began rolling in.[8] In 1959, U.S. advisers boasted that the "new [police] records bureau" set up by ICA's Public Safety Division was "probably the greatest and most productive improvement made by the National Police since the inception of the Public Safety Program."[9] The archives later fell into neglect, accounting for their calamitous condition in 2005. But, ironically enough, U.S. intervention deserves some credit for there being police records left for postwar investigators to find at all.

Lest something so seemingly banal as records management assistance be dismissed as a neutral component of interstate collaboration, a 1957 letter from the State Department's R. Richard Rubottom to a colleague at the ICA

spoke to the intentions of U.S. police aid in all its forms. "We do not undertake programs to improve the efficiency of Latin American police forces per se," Rubottom emphasized. "Where we do render them technical and material assistance, it is for the stated objective of increasing their capability to combat communist subversion."[10] U.S. intervention in Guatemala is better known for bloodier feats: deposing a democratically elected president; arming "neurotic" anticommunists to the teeth; offering political cover for state-sponsored terror; and providing technical assistance to security forces while knowing, at every step of the way, that those forces were using U.S. aid and political capital to commit crimes against their own citizens. But record keeping, too, belongs on that list. U.S. aid impacted both the *form* of the police (and military) archives—their comprehensiveness, storage and organizational methods, and materials used—and their *content*, the history of repression revealed by the documents today. The United States led the restructuring of the PN from 1954 until the shutdown of its global police aid programs in 1974, a period that saw the force transformed into the shock troops of a newly mechanized urban counterinsurgency. U.S. assistance in matters archival cannot be separated from U.S. assistance in matters more broadly counterinsurgent, which is why both subjects are treated together in this chapter.

U.S. support for Guatemala's twentieth-century dictatorships, particularly its military aid, would surely have had even more disastrous ramifications absent the extensive reporting carried out by a generation of activists, journalists, and academics. Meanwhile, though, aid to the National Police has gone understudied and underpublicized.[11] Army generals were the main architects of the counterinsurgency, including its genocidal period, 1981–1983, after urban counterterror forced the insurgency into the countryside.[12] But the PN were direct protagonists in many of the state's most brazen acts of political violence: the March 1966 mass disappearance of "Los 28," the Spanish embassy fire, the murders of Manuel Colom Argueta and Alberto Fuentes Mohr, the suppression of the Coca-Cola bottling plant strikes, the 1980 mass abduction and disappearance of National Workers' Confederation trade unionists, the Mutual Support Group disappearances of 1984 and 1985, and more. To ignore the PN's role, particularly in the methodical destruction of the urban labor and student movements, elides the complexity of Guatemala's armed conflict. The police, alas, were no mere sideshow.

This chapter tells the story of how U.S. advisers took a "trigger-happy" force with a habit of shooting submachine guns "indiscriminately" into crowds of peaceful demonstrators, spent nearly twenty years in close collaboration with

them, and exited the scene under congressional fire in the mid-1970s.[13] They left behind a National Police with the barest of increased competence in civilian law enforcement, but which had been significantly restructured in the service of counterinsurgency priorities. U.S. advisers consistently recommended and enacted the rationalizing of those operating procedures most central to U.S. Cold War objectives: assembling a surveillance archive, streamlining political investigations, encouraging tactical collaboration and intelligence-sharing between the PN and the military, and constructing a regional telecommunications network that would link the highest echelons of the hemisphere's fiercest counterinsurgency apparatus.[14] The transformation of the PN during the war's first phase began with the transformation of its archives.

POLICING THE AMERICAS

The notion that the United States should advance its geopolitical interests by training and funding foreign police forces originally drew inspiration from European colonial practices. The theory became reality during the U.S. occupations of the Philippines, Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic during the early twentieth century.[15] The long-term institutional character of U.S. international police aid, however, was forged slightly later, under Franklin D. Roosevelt. Roosevelt created the Institute of Inter-American Affairs (IIAA) in 1942 as part of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (OCIA). Both outfits were designed as wartime vehicles for promoting economic development and improvements in hemispheric public health, with no prima facie involvement in questions of security. Their creation was part of the Good Neighbor Policy and indicative of a U.S. shift, if largely rhetorical, away from gunboat diplomacy.

The twin menaces of Bolshevism and fascism, though, made maintaining hemispheric "stability" a high priority, not only for ensuring economic dominance and improving health indicators but also for anticommunist political retrenchment. In the early 1940s, the FBI began establishing a presence in Latin America, on the assumption "that surreptitious police contacts could be used as intelligence sources for keeping track of Nazi activities inside Latin America"—contacts that could be kept and used to advantage after the end of the Second World War.[16] Both the FBI and the CIA pursued covert relations with Latin American police forces, and although the IIAA was ostensibly geared toward economic development, it would not avoid the polarization of the Cold War. The IIAA became the International Cooperation Administration, the State Department's economic development agency, in 1955; it also, somewhat counterintuitively for an economic aid outfit, coordinated foreign police

assistance programs. Six years later, the ICA became USAID, and the Kennedy administration's 1962 move to create the Office of Public Safety (OPS), consolidating diverse police programs into one administrative unit housed within USAID, was unpopular among officials who had joined the organization to build wells, not distribute guns. But despite USAID director Hamilton Fowler's position that "a police program had no place in an organization whose mission was to provide economic and technical assistance in such areas as agriculture, public health, and education," and his colleagues' discomfort with working alongside "redneck cops and spooks," the USAID officials were overruled.[17]

In 1957, when Inter-American Affairs approved the expansion of the ICA's existing "Guatemalan project," it did so only provided that a set of conditions be met. These included the following:

1. That it be made clear that the ultimate objective of this program is "to strengthen the capability of internal security forces . . . with the purpose of enabling them more effectively to counter (communist) subversion". . . .
2. That the technicians to be sent to Guatemala be briefed to this effect prior to their departure.
3. That the highly political nature of their work be made clear to the technicians assigned to Guatemala.
4. That an instruction be sent to Guatemala . . . directing that a special relationship be established between the police mission and the Embassy in view of the political nature of its work.[18]

These directives set the tone for what became a long and dynamic relationship between the United States and Guatemala's police. U.S. advisers' work with the PN involved some initiatives that, divorced from their broader context, seemed perfectly benign—providing extra uniforms, so that working-class agents who previously slept in their only uniforms could rotate outfits; training in vehicle maintenance for safer patrolling; implementing tour-of-duty schedule changes, so agents could spend more time with their families.[19] However, these were incidental details within the larger paradigm of a global strategic program to internationalize police assistance, whose goal was to construct a "combined U.S.-indigenous defense system" that would deeply involve Third World police in the effort to contain communism.[20] As Martha Huggins notes, it was no coincidence that the National Security Council's 1290D police assistance expansion, which foreshadowed the Office of Public Safety, was proposed in the very year of the Viet Minh victory at Dien Bien Phu and as the CIA was completing its plans to overthrow Arbenz.[21] The escalation of U.S. international security aid was designed to prevent further such "losses"—and

to facilitate its own intelligence gathering, the fruits of which today lie in the U.S. National Archives. The list of receiver countries for police aid programs reads like a marquee of potential dominoes: South Vietnam, Brazil, Uruguay, Colombia, Greece, South Korea. In Guatemala's case, U.S. objectives mapped all too well onto local elites' desire to crush any move that stunk, to them, of the "exotic horrors" of the Revolutionary Spring.[22]

In 1955, when Castillo Armas first solicited technical assistance with intelligence-gathering from the United States, the ICA identified no fewer than ten different formal "countersubversion" bodies: the Civil Police, the Secret Police, the Treasury Police, the Government Investigative Police, the Investigative Squad of the Civil Police, the Presidential Police, a unit called "Coronado Lima's Investigative Group," the Immigration Investigative Service, the Army G-2, and the National Committee for Defense against Communism.[23] These groups carried out the post-Arbenz purges, in which some nine thousand people were detained and ten thousand forced into exile.[24] Some of these rival groups were already well known to the Americans, because CIA agents had collaborated with the National Committee for Defense against Communism in compiling the blacklist, mentioned in the previous chapter, of Arbenz loyalists, PGT members, and other perceived enemies.[25] Here, archival surveillance was consciously being used, and taught, as a technology of social control years before the war began. When Major Enrique Trinidad Oliva, Castillo Armas's coordinator of technical cooperation with the ICA and the "number 2 man in government," complained to the ICA about the absence of a central police records system, embassy officials pointed out that although they had already established a file system on subversives—the CIA blacklist—"doubtless the Embassy's revelation that there were a number of persons with communist records among a group of exiles cleared recently by the Government for re-entry into Guatemala highlighted this problem for Major Oliva." In other words, the embassy not only built a hit list for the regime but pointed out when the Guatemalans had missed one. But this was apparently not good enough; Oliva's central records bureau would materialize too, in short order.

Along with the organized intelligence structures, ICA observers noted, most government ministers and the heads of the aforementioned groups employed their own confidential agents, many of whom spent "a certain amount of time spying on each other." From an efficiency standpoint, this was a mess; embassy second secretary William B. Connett Jr. characterized the intelligence services as "dispersed, pragmatic, uncoordinated, built to a large degree around personalities, untrained in investigative techniques, hampered by political intrigue and, in general, relatively ineffectual."[26] Security forces

were brutal but inefficient; zealously anticommunist but poorly trained and equipped; willing to act but territorial and mistrustful of rivals. The proffered remedy was, in a word, *professionalization*, as it would remain for generations of police reform through century's end and beyond.

With so many areas in need of "professionalization," one might imagine that the incoming U.S. team would hardly know where to begin. But while the initial phase of U.S. assistance was more limited than at later points, its priorities were clear: special investigations, information management, and the centralization and streamlining of political policing. These were also Castillo Armas's objectives. In 1956, he created the General Directorate for National Security (DGSN), a secret service that would coordinate and consolidate state efforts to repress what it considered to be communist subversion. It inherited the blacklist archive generated by the CIA and the National Committee for Defense against Communism.[27] (The DGSN also worked to assemble new lists of its own, requiring, for example, the proprietors of hotels and inns to nightly submit their guest lists, to facilitate the tracking of foreigners from "suspicious" countries and individuals on the run for political reasons.)[28]

Also in 1956, Fimbres recommended that the United States immediately send a specialist to provide training in physical and technical surveillance (including records management), interrogation techniques, and the use of scientific methods in special investigations.[29] However, the specialists first sent, David Laughlin and John Popa, soon realized that they would need to spend the Public Safety Program's initial phase undertaking far more basic forms of professionalization—improving working conditions and trimming patrol rosters—to strengthen the PN's "very low morale and lack of esprit du corps" and boost retention in order to make the training worthwhile.[30] The aforementioned early development of the PN's record keeping was one of the principal gains from this first stage of assistance, and the Guatemalans were quick studies, keeping suspect individuals' files at the ready if the time to act arose. The first entry in the police file on social democratic politician Manuel Colom Argueta, for example, was made in 1957, and twenty-two years' worth of archival surveillance later, Colom was assassinated at police hands.[31] By the late 1950s, the training had made significant inroads in rationalizing police operations; it was clear who had come to run the show at PN headquarters, and quickly at that. In 1958, when Major Piloña left his post as the police's director-general, he issued a press release touting seven major areas of advancement under his tenure. Laughlin noted, in a memo back to Washington, that six of the seven accomplishments Piloña cited were, in fact, "the direct result of programs initiated and carried out by the Public Safety Division of ICA."[32]

Though the initial phase of Public Safety Program (PSP) assistance was originally slated for phaseout in 1961, the U.S. Operations Mission decided in 1959 to "wait and see" before shutting down the program, owing to concern at the triumph of the Cuban Revolution.[33] For domestic elites, it was a felicitous move, as internal unrest swelled with President Ydígoras Fuentes's decision to allow the United States to train the Bay of Pigs invasion force in Guatemalan territory. Ydígoras was widely viewed as a corrupt, weak leader, and his Bay of Pigs move smacked of opportunism and pro-U.S. servility. In August 1960—just three months before the 13 November revolt by army dissidents that sparked the war—Ydígoras Fuentes went to the United States for assistance in responding to the "recent disturbances, the probable source of the agitation, and the threat it poses for the stability of constitutional government."[34] By suggesting that Soviet-backed communists were nipping at Guatemala's heels, Ydígoras marshaled U.S. support for the repression of legitimate social and economic grievances. The ensuing recommendations, made by PSP adviser Rex D. Morris, provided the template for continued U.S. security assistance; the double threat of Cuba and a homegrown insurgency was seen to justify extreme measures.[35] Morris's recommendations, which were endorsed and eventually implemented in various forms, became the foundation of security forces' urban counterinsurgency strategy for decades to come.

COMMON THUGS AND ASSASSINS

Morris's 1960 counterinsurgency blueprint called for U.S. advisers to create within the PN a Special Investigations Bureau and a Central Records Bureau. The Special Investigations Bureau, to be staffed by specifically trained personnel, would be constituted by presidential decree and granted authority to apprehend anyone suspected of "crimes threatening constitutional Government." Its responsibilities would be as follows: "To investigate and be informed concerning A) political interests of social, business, and labor organizations as these effect [*sic*] the government, B) political activities of foreign nationals (e.g. communists and other agents with interests adverse to the State's, C) Guatemalan citizens with outside political interests and/or allegiances, and D) Guatemala [*sic*] citizens who otherwise have political interests contrary to the interests of the country."[36] An "Intelligence Coordinator," reporting directly to the president, would manage the bureau's activities.

Along with the Special Investigations Bureau, Morris proposed a Central Records Bureau "for the purpose of collecting, filing, and evaluating all records pertaining to persons involved in any form of criminal activity, such as fingerprints, arrest records, photographs, personal descriptions, alias files, and

the like."[37] It would allow the PN to build detailed criminal histories of particular individuals, track their activities over time, and make full use of a standard law enforcement tool: the background check. However, what sounded like routine policing—keeping track of lawbreakers—took on a sinister cast when designed primarily to apply to those with "political interests contrary to the interests of the country." The Central Records Bureau, or central archives of the National Police, was consolidated in 1967, organizing data to be searchable both by surname and by crime type.[38] For example, in addition to maintaining files on individuals of interest, the police's Master File Registry indexed agents' and informants' reports by category of interest; these indices included "Communist Agitators," "Subversives," "University Campus," "Demonstrations," and "Cadavers."[39]

The final recommendation pertained to a favorite cause of U.S. advisers, though one that would not be implemented until the late 1960s: the integration of the feared Judicial Police into the organizational structure of the PN. The National Police was founded in 1881, but the Judicial Police's particular brand of social control was a more recent development; the "Secret Police," its institutional ancestor, first appeared in 1900.[40] Dictator Jorge Ubico famously relied upon this "auxiliary army," almost always run by military personnel, which cultivated its reputation for savage efficiency in the dispatch of enemies. (For this it was disbanded after the 1944 revolution and reinstated after 1954.)[41] Variously incarnated over time as the Judicial Police, the Judicial Guard, or the Judicial Department, to ordinary Guatemalans its goons, who were organizationally separate from the PN, were collectively dreaded and derided as *La Judy*.[42] Its leaders were notorious: one Judicial Police head under Ydígoras Fuentes, Jorge Córdova Molina, was also a ringleader of Mano Blanca, perhaps the most infamous of Guatemala's 1960s death squads.[43] Córdova Molina, described in U.S. documents as a "common thug and assassin," and other Judicial Police officers had close ties to the far-right Movement of National Liberation (MLN), itself responsible for numerous extrajudicial executions of labor, student, and popular movement leaders throughout the armed conflict.[44] When the Judiciales were disbanded (on paper, but not in deed) in 1966, papers reported on their newly revealed torture chambers at Zone 1's La Tigrera compound, from whence screams had regularly echoed along the thoroughfares outside its gates. Reporters noted that the exiting *jefes* had taken their hoods, tins of insecticide (*gamexán*), garroting cords, and other torture implements with them upon vacating their positions.[45]

As the theory went, integrating the Judiciales into the National Police would eliminate redundancy vis-à-vis the "overlapping intelligence and 'po-

FIG. 4.1 A plain-clothes *judicial* (special agent) of the Judicial Police. © Jean-Marie Simon/2012.

litical' functions" they shared. It would centralize political policing and, allegedly, separate countersubversive activities from civilian policing.[46] It also provided an opportunity, as recommended by the Americans thereafter, to create a separate intelligence unit fulfilling Judicial Police functions that would report directly to the president: "La Regional," the U.S.-established communications network allowing security forces to share intelligence and collaborate on special ops. Here, however, theory and praxis diverged: the separate intelligence unit was indeed created, and the Judicial Police were indeed fused into the PN structure. But the old Judiciales never changed their ways; rather, they continued to collaborate with military structures in extralegal operations.[47] The implications of melding the Judiciales and the National Police were clear for the future of civilian policing. Weaving an autonomous

political force into the PN without bringing it under control would have disastrous results. From 1966 on, the Judiciales—"the principal agent of political repression," in one newspaper's words—would operate in close coordination with a newly resurgent army, from within the heart of the civilian police.[48] The moniker of "Judiciales" would be shed, but its modus operandi would not.

The USAID advisers were well aware of the Judiciales' abuses. In a 1962 memo, public safety chief Herbert O. Hardin noted that "it was not uncommon for the police to open fire on the participants in disturbances on the slightest provocation, and the results were usually tragic." Demonstrating the confused logic of U.S. police aid, Hardin then discussed how "in order to discourage the use of such weapons and tactics, 700 revolvers were furnished to the National Police in Guatemala in 1957."[49] He went on to describe how the Judicial Police were sent in ahead of the PN to control the peaceful anticorruption protests known as "Las Jornadas de Marzo y Abril de 1962," or the Days of March and April 1962. In these demonstrations, thousands of workers, politicians, and students poured into the streets to denounce the Ydígoras regime in the largest street protests since Ubico's 1944 overthrow.[50] In one such demonstration, he wrote, Judicial Police chief Jorge Córdova Molina "engaged in indiscriminate behavior, firing his submachine gun into the mob. This had a chain reaction on the rest of the Judicial Police who also began firing indiscriminately at the rioters." Once the Judicial Police began firing, the PN rear guard began spraying their own, USAID-supplied bullets into the crowd—"directly contrary to the advice and teaching which the police had received through the US Public Safety Program," Hardin huffed. Never one to miss the silver lining on a dark cloud, Hardin believed "that the actions of the USAID Public Safety Advisor in prevailing upon the National Police to cease using rifled firearms and rely on depressed fire from riot guns resulted in the saving of numerous lives and probably lowered the number of casualties considerably." U.S. assistance bore no responsibility for the casualties, Hardin implied, because the PSP had not worked with this particular Judicial Police chief. He neglected to mention that the PSP had developed an "interesting exchange of relations" with the Judiciales two years earlier, providing scholarships for its agents to receive special training in Puerto Rico and having an ICA adviser teach a class at its training academy in the very handling and use of firearms.[51]

USAID worked with the Judicial Police and other repressive police subentities again and again. A constant problem, in fact, was that the Guatemalan state was consistently less interested in funding the police than the United States was. Over the course of the PSP, U.S. documents repeatedly lament the

Guatemalans' "inertia" when it came to supporting the police, mainly because the military was loath to fortify its perceived rival, particularly after General Enrique Peralta Azurdia assumed military rule in 1963. (This, too, occurred at the behest of the United States, which pre-cleared Peralta's seizure of power to dodge a democratic election that progressive ex-president Juan José Arevalo stood good odds of winning.)[52] At times, impatient Public Safety officials simply could not wait for the Guatemalans to get their act together, ultimately opting not to require the official disbanding of the Judicial Police before pushing to create the centralized intelligence apparatus designed to supplant it. The Guatemalan state was dragging its heels because, "despite recommendations for abolition of the Judicial Police, each regime has found it expedient to retain it as an organization to carry out questionable and distasteful tasks."[53] And so, rather than replacing the Judiciales, the new intelligence organization simply ended up incorporating them into its strategy. As early as 1963, "very encouraging progress" had been made in establishing a "centralized intelligence organization along [the] lines [of the] FBI [with] some features [of the] CIA." U.S. advisers ensured that any chief named by the government to head this unit would be "acceptable to us."[54]

In the meantime, popular discontent led to the formation of the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) in 1962. As insurgency filtered into Guatemala City, U.S. advisers, domestic business elites, and the military finally agreed that it was indeed worth beefing up the PN's specialized forces. Serendipitously, John F. Kennedy had backed a substantial expansion of the Public Safety Program in 1962, in the form of USAID's Office of Public Safety, granting it powers greater than those of any other division of USAID. The president and Robert F. Kennedy also backed the creation of the Inter-American Police Academy in the Panama Canal Zone, later moved to Washington and renamed the International Police Academy. In Guatemala, therefore, on-the-ground political escalation dovetailed with an expansion of U.S. police aid worldwide. The Guatemalan police program would become among the largest and highest-profile OPS initiatives in the hemisphere.

A 1964 document drafted by the OPS's director spoke to rising concern over guerrilla incursions into the city, noting that while the preceding two administrations had "done little" to improve the PN, the Guatemalan government "now indicates its desire, with Public Safety assistance, to reorganize and improve the police."[55] Some of the sense of escalation was manufactured: USAID adviser D. L. Crisostomo noted in a report that various of the supposed "terrorist bombings" in the city were actually the handiwork of state forces, blamed on FAR guerrillas "in order to preserve a certain climate of tension"

that would justify state terror. Some of the violence was certainly authentic, but the Guatemalan state used the crimes of a small cluster of insurgents, who in the Americans' estimation were nowhere near strong enough to threaten the existing regime, to justify a broader campaign against urban civil society.[56] The government studiously ignored the mounting activity of death squads like Mano Blanca, fronts for coordinated action between security forces and the MLN against not only suspected communists but also mainstream political parties like the Revolutionary Party (PR), the MLN's main rival.[57] As discussed previously, Mano Blanca's commander was a Judicial Police chief, but this was not the only level of interconnection between the extreme Right, death squads, the state, and U.S. assistance. As Greg Grandin writes, though the United States tried to distance itself from growing death squad violence, "the wrath of these private avengers was just as fundamental to U.S. goals as were the zeal and enthusiasm of PGT activists to the democratic achievements of the [1944] October Revolution."[58]

This new consensus, based on the police-military cooperation prioritized by U.S. advisers since the outset, required the technical means for interagency coordination. In 1964, PSP aide Alfred Naurocki led the creation of a Guatemala City–based telecommunications network connected to a Central America–wide system, linking various state security forces with U.S. counterpart facilities in the Canal Zone; Michael McClintock writes that the development of communications networks within Guatemala's security forces was the most significant assistance ever provided by PSP personnel.[59] Soon after Naurocki's arrival in May, Peralta created a "Presidential Intelligence Agency" housed in his official residence. By October, the agency was fully in operation, culling intelligence and sharing it with other Central American security forces. It sent the Judiciales to approach government agencies with requests for information on long lists of citizens supposedly belonging to "leftist factions," seeking to determine and monitor their whereabouts.[60] By the spring of 1966, the Regional Telecommunications Center, its staff later known as "La Regional" and eventually as "El Archivo," connected on a private frequency the leadership of the National Police, Treasury Police, Judicial Police, Interior Ministry, the presidential residence, and the military communications center. It was moved next door to the Casa Presidencial and placed at the disposal of the defense minister and the Army General Staff, becoming the nerve center of state terrorism. It represented the very streamlining sought by U.S. advisers and provided a newly empowered military the tools to assume direction of the war and make use of a restructured National Police.[61]

As the urban firefight escalated, USAID pulled a crack counterterrorism

adviser, John P. Longan, out of Venezuela to lend a hand. Longan arrived in November 1965 with the aim of establishing a PN rapid-response unit that could quickly and flexibly handle disturbance control and special operations. He developed a new raid tactic called the Frozen Area Plan, designed to "force some of the wanted communists out of hiding and into police hands," and trained trusted agents in its implementation. Longan's oeuvre would come to be known as Operación Limpieza, a set of March 1966 raids in which security forces kidnapped and tortured more than thirty labor and peasant activists before dumping their bodies into the sea.[62] Operación Limpieza bestowed upon the Guatemalan state the dishonor of having invented the forced disappearance, a tactic soon to spread among Latin American dictatorships as anti-communist terror became both industrialized and exportable. The "Communist big-leaguers," in one U.S. advisor's words, who were murdered in the 1966 raids, including PGT leaders Víctor Manuel Gutiérrez and Leonardo Castillo Flores, had been identified more than a decade earlier by CIA operatives and included on the Castillo Armas regime's blacklist.[63]

This mass disappearance was a watershed. From 1966 on, state violence became mechanized, incautious, and seemingly unstoppable—not that U.S. advisers ever tried to halt it. After the 1966 disappearances, the embassy ran political cover for the Guatemalan state, denying having information on the crimes despite having been kept apprised at every step; in fact, in 1965 Longan had emphasized that it was "a must" to maintain the ability of U.S. personnel to "influence police operations," in order to maintain the ability to defend U.S. interests at a moment's notice.[64] U.S. advisers built the unit responsible for Operación Limpieza from the ground up; they established and maintained the telecommunications network allowing the military, the police, and the OPS to share intelligence leading directly to the captures. They kept in close contact with the Judicial Police, even though (or, perhaps, because) it was Judicial Police agents who, in coordination with military high command, raided the Zone 12 house in which Víctor Manuel Gutiérrez—archived as the country's "#1 Communist"—was hiding, abducted him, tied a hood over his head, and ran electric currents through his slim body until his heart stopped.[65] Though the government kept quiet about the killings, the Left knew who bore the blame: a month after the March 1966 disappearances, the head of the Judicial Police, Alberto Barrios, was forced into exile by attempts on his life. According to U.S. ambassador John Gordon Mein, the March abductions were "a considerable success"; the murders, and the embassy's blithe attitude toward them, were avenged with the death of Mein himself at the hands of the FAR two years later.[66] Mein's assassination spurred increased U.S. engagement. Following

the Mein killing, the number of Public Safety in-country personnel jumped to seven from its previous average of three.

"TRANQUILITY AND PEACE"

The 1966–1970 period saw a tremendous escalation in the counterinsurgency and the military's consolidation of power, with Colonel Carlos Arana Osorio, the "Jackal of Zacapa," bringing scorched-earth tactics to the countryside for the first time.[67] But March 1966 also ushered in a significant expansion of police assistance and police-military activity in the capital, as Operación Limpieza had demonstrated what real collaboration between the military, the police, and U.S. advisers could achieve. Perhaps no act of stagecraft better represented the new counterinsurgency consensus than a blessing performed in front of the Metropolitan Cathedral on 13 March 1967. Under a high, late-summer sun, Guatemala's conservative archbishop, Monseñor Mario Casariego, sprinkled holy water onto fifty-four new Ford Broncos and Falcons acquired from the United States for the PN's radio patrol corps.[68] As the strains of the national anthem bled out into the plaza, the archbishop blessed each vehicle individually, expressing his pleasure at a purchase that would, he opined, bring "tranquility and peace" to *capitalinos*. After receiving the church's blessing, the patrol vehicles paraded around the park, across to Sexta Avenida, and south to the Plaza Italia. In attendance were the vice-minister of defense, Colonel Manuel Francisco Sosa Ávila; the entire PN leadership, including director-general Colonel Víctor Manuel Gamboa and third director Colonel Hernán Ponce Nitsch (later the PN director-general under Ríos Montt, a close friend); and Peter Costello, chief public safety officer for USAID in Guatemala.[69] (The year before, the PN had given Costello a special award recognizing the "useful services" he had provided to the organization.)[70]

Colonel Sosa, the vice-minister of defense presiding over the ceremony, was a major player in the U.S.-led streamlining of the counterinsurgency. Embassy documents identify Sosa as the Guatemalan "counterinsurgency coordinator," charged with administering the joint military-police operations that had made the late 1960s so productive in the detentions and executions of supposed communists.[71] Sosa, a friend of Méndez Montenegro's dating back to their military training in Chile, was an elusive character, deeply enmeshed in extralegal activities but with a low public profile. He never attained the notoriety of his contemporaries, though he deserved to. It was a measure of the PN's counterinsurgent importance—or, at least, of the importance of certain PN subsquads—that a figure like Sosa was named director-general of the National Police (DGPN) in March 1967. The USAID team was encouraged by

Sosa's appointment; over lunch that July, OPS chief Byron Engle assured the colonel that he would be pleased to assist him in arranging "the most expeditious method" of procuring equipment in the United States.[72] The CIA's Special Operations secret intelligence handbook from 1967 also mentioned the colonel. It noted approvingly that since Sosa's appointment as DGPN, the police had "been filling its responsibilities more effectively, particularly its counterinsurgency role. The police are more active than previously and are cooperating with the army in forming special counterterrorist squads which operate clandestinely against leftist insurgents."[73]

Translated, this genteel language of productivity meant that Sosa was using the PN as a base from which to run death squads, and not only involving the Judicial Police. Within the PN's corps (*cuerpo*) structure, four major corps were responsible for much of the city's policing.[74] Sosa selected the Fourth Corps (Cuarto Cuerpo) as the institutional home for "a special police unit that operated largely without reference to legal procedure," selecting loyalists to fill its ranks.[75] The unit was fully operational just a few months after Sosa began as DGPN, working with the army's Special Commando Unit (SCUGA); led by Colonel Máximo Zepeda, SCUGA, established in January 1967, was a key player in the military's urban apparatus.[76] One of the Fourth Corps' most significant hits, besides its takedown of Mano Blanca leader Jorge Córdova Molina in an act of interagency rivalry, was the abduction, torture, and murder of PGT leaders Rafael Tischler Guzmán, Cayetano Barreno Juárez, Julio César Armas González, and Enrique de la Torre Morel.[77] By October 1967, the Fourth Corps was "widely regarded by Guatemalans as the headquarters of the government's hush, hush anti-insurgent squads."[78]

Sosa's effectiveness would have been no surprise to the Americans, given their knowledge of how in 1966, as vice-minister of defense, Sosa was responsible for setting up joint army-police operations in city and countryside. On top of that, Sosa created the first death squad "phantom groups"—organizations like the New Anti-Communist Organization (NOA) and the Anti-Communist Council of Guatemala (CADEG), propaganda fronts behind which ad hoc coalitions of retired and active-duty army and police officers conducted extrajudicial executions. These squads also disseminated literature designed to terrorize. As one CADEG pamphlet read, "[We] must search until we find the castro-communist traitors who must pay with their lives for the crimes against their country that they have committed by returning [from Cuba], and without any piety they must die like rabid dogs, and their filthy corpses should not be given shelter by the blessed earth of Guatemala, but instead they must serve to stuff vultures' bellies."[79] That the CIA's special operations

manual of 1967 indicated how "President Méndez is aware of the activities of these squads and is willing to gamble that they will not get out of hand" suggests that the embassy, too, was aware of the activities of these squads and gambled that they would not get out of hand.[80] As on other occasions, it was an unwise, self-serving bet.[81]

In the late 1960s, as at various moments throughout the armed conflict, U.S. advisers tolerated lapses in the legality of *covert* counterinsurgency operations, and at times registered their disapproval of same, even as they provided enthusiastic assistance for the police's *overt* counterinsurgency operations. Though no OPS official would ever have claimed to support the seamier side of antiguerrilla activity, their ongoing cooperation in "legit" operations—at times barely distinguishable from the extralegal—provided ample cover for dirty deeds. One instance of OPS participation in what Longan referred to as "overt" counterinsurgency measures was the office's close collaboration with Sosa in the development of a 1967 "pilot plan" for implementation in Guatemala City's Zone 5, a working-class barrio and PGT stronghold.[82] In the pilot plan, more than two hundred foot-patrol agents and dozens on bicycles and motorcycles—with "all the equipment to be provided by the Public Security Division of [US]AID"—would establish "an absolute control over the zone."[83] When Sosa announced the Zone 5 pilot plan in a press conference, he stressed his desire "that the National Police be a respectable and respected institution, that the institution provide a full guarantee of citizen safety, and that our citizens feel closer and closer to the police, without any sort of fear." (Citizens should well have felt closer to the police, as PN agents were now tracking all manner of public activities, including local fairs, concerts, lucha libre matches, church sermons, and community meetings, in order to learn the contours of daily life in different neighborhoods.)[84] In his description of the plan, Sosa dropped USAID's name several times.[85] When the specially trained pilot plan agents were honored with USAID diplomas, the U.S. national anthem was even played at the award ceremony.[86] The Zone 5 raids were overt, but what happened to those detained—not to mention the subsequent uses of the guns, vehicles, and ammunition provided for the operation—was never made public.

The contortions in logic caused by this apparent disjuncture—and the confusion of the military and police when embassy officials publicly reprimanded them for "excesses" OPS advisers had privately tolerated—were microcosmic of the larger schizophrenia of U.S. development policy. Stephen Streeter writes that the entire Alliance for Progress initiative in Guatemala was characterized by an internal contradiction between its "soft" democratization efforts, theoretically aimed at developing democratic liberalism, and its massive military

buildup, devoted to liberalism's bloody repression.[87] A similar tension existed between U.S. efforts to generally professionalize the PN—by providing filing cabinets, records training, vehicles, and the like—and U.S. efforts to deploy the PN as the frontline executors of a war against the segments of civil society it saw as politically suspect. Ultimately, the former aid not only legitimized the latter; it was adapted to its purposes. But while there may have been tension between soft and hard approaches for those on the "soft" side who thought of themselves as democratizers, in fact, rather than representing an "internal contradiction," the two approaches were mutually dependent.

Sosa himself served as DGPN for only a year, until his prestige fell victim to public outrage over the kidnapping of Archbishop Casariego in March 1968. Initially decried by the military as an act of the FAR, the kidnapping was revealed to be a faux *secuestro* designed to discredit the Left; rumors flew about the army's responsibility. Though the archbishop eventually went home unscathed, two civilians involved in the imbroglio were taken away in a police car; in transit the car stopped and the police agents exited, spraying the car with more than fifty bullets and killing the handcuffed prisoners. The crime shocked the country, and the resulting scandal spurred even Méndez Montenegro, a weak leader who ruled subject to a pact giving the military full discretion over the counterinsurgency, to action. Because the army's role in the plot became impossible to deny, the president opted for a symbolic gesture that suggested a reining-in of extralegal tactics. The state's "three top counterinsurgents"—Sosa, defense minister Arriaga Bosque, and Zacapa commander Colonel Carlos Arana Osorio—were all packed off to low-profile diplomatic positions.[88] Sosa was shipped to Madrid as Guatemala's military attaché to Spain, supposedly punished for having employed unacceptable tactics.

For a year, that is: in June 1969, Sosa returned to Guatemala, lured back by Méndez Montenegro and appointed interior minister—head of the ministry overseeing his former charge, the PN. His return sparked protests from the University of San Carlos (USAC) Association of University Students (AEU), which issued a statement in *El Imparcial* condemning how Sosa's appointment "condones . . . the bloody acts that have brought mourning to thousands of Guatemalan homes."[89] The embassy speculated that Sosa was reinstalled to mollify the MLN hard-liners accusing Méndez Montenegro of being a soft-on-crime leftist sympathizer.[90] But MLNistas were not the only ones pleased by Sosa's return. Ambassador Davis, who was aware of Sosa's "illegal operations" involving the Fourth Corps, NOA, and CADEG death squads, wrote that "Col. Sosa is undoubtedly a stronger figure than his predecessor . . . and may inject needed vigor into police operations in a time of prospective troubles."[91]

The dissolution of the Judicial Police, the OPS objective nearly a decade in the making, would prove the first major case of institutional recycling within the National Police. Méndez Montenegro officially disbanded the Judicial Police, with great fanfare, in August 1966. Officials promised an end to the methods of the past: the reviled Judiciales would be replaced by the Detective Corps (Cuerpo de Detectives), a new squad to be characterized by technical professionalism, not political revanchism. Yet the Judiciales did not cease operations until 1970, and when the Detective Corps was finally constituted in its place, it was evident that the new structure differed from the old in name only. Army colonel José Vicente Morales, the head of the Judicial Police until the day of its actual demise in November 1970, continued on as the inaugural chief of the Detective Corps.[92] A number of the former heads of the Judiciales—themselves living archives of political knowledge, and hence powerful—were murdered in the years immediately following the switch, suggesting internal power plays and the continued use of "old" tactics with which to dispatch not only "subversives" but also rivals.[93] The Detective Corps would achieve its own notoriety in the coming years until 1982, when it was disbanded, or rather renamed, anew.

The year 1970 was also when Arana Osorio, another of the late-1960s counterinsurgency directors briefly rotated out of Guatemala by Méndez Montenegro, was elected president on the MLN ticket. U.S. advisers saw Arana as a tough, nationalist caudillo with little political acumen and "a reputation for relentless anti-Communism [and] political naïveté, a simplistic point of view, and a willingness to adopt extremist solutions when he feels they are necessary."[94] If forced disappearances and bustling death squad activity had come to Guatemala under a civilian regime, they would remain under a military one: the colonel brought his Zacapa allies, the "civilian extremists" who collaborated in the rural antiguerrilla campaign of 1967–1968, to serve as his personal security force. Their "history of violent, irrational activity," combined with the MLN's tight control over Congress and the military's support for Arana's law-and-order modus operandi, meant that the terror state would take no quarter in crushing dissent.[95]

Arana declared a state of siege in November, suspending the few remaining civil liberties and imposing a curfew "as complete as ever has been witnessed in Guatemala." In the first week of the siege, security forces picked up miniskirted girls and long-haired young men off downtown streets, yanking down the skirt hems of the former and shaving the heads of the latter. Ponytailed men, stereotyped as rebels, were a favorite target of Arana: "Is it too much to ask that people make the temporary sacrifice of going to the barbershop and

cutting their hair?" the president wondered in a late 1970 speech, entreating honest Guatemalans to help security forces separate citizen and criminal by trimming their locks.[96] Arana's army also violated USAC autonomy by raiding university buildings later that month. Arana was particularly loathed on the USAC campus, known to radicals around the university as "El Araña," or "the Spider."[97] The USAC rector, Rafael Cuevas del Cid, outraged at the invasion, told his colleagues: "Autonomy does not reside in the university buildings, but rather resides in human dignity. Dignity that they can piss on. Dignity that they can massacre. But dignity that will not be destroyed. Intelligence, my friends, does not die, with buildings or without them."[98] The general, however, begged to differ. "Some of you already know by now," Arana intoned in his 1970 Christmas radio address, "that we are disposed to pacify Guatemala now and not later; that our present actions are like an unstoppable machine, which is to say, that we must pursue the goal until we achieve it."[99]

The U.S. Agency for International Development opted to join the fight. In 1970, the OPS approved significant allocations to the National Police—$410,000 for the construction of a training academy and $378,000 in "contingency funds" for a Rapid Police Development Project—despite nagging concerns about the new government's propensity for the extralegal.[100] After Arana's ascent to the presidency, and the accompanying spike in extrajudicial executions of students, journalists, and labor leaders, it became clear to some USAID and embassy apparatchiks that the United States could not avoid blame, or at least bad press, for its association with Guatemalan security forces.[101] Two years earlier, the outgoing embassy chief of mission, Viron P. Vaky, had lamented the U.S. decision to condone "indiscriminate" and "brutal" tactics, arguing that this had irreparably damaged the U.S. image and wondering, "Is it conceivable that we are so obsessed with insurgency that we are prepared to rationalize murder as an acceptable counterinsurgency weapon?"[102]

In March 1970, FAR operatives abducted Sean Holly, the embassy's second secretary. Speculating as to his captors' motives after his safe release, Holly reported that they were "particularly unhappy [with], as a matter of fact they hate, the Military Group and our assistance to the police. They hold us responsible for the repression by the military and the repression, murder and torture of their people by the police. They went on to talk about why we were giving cars, the radio room [Regional Telecommunications Center], and all this to the Guatemalans when they knew that we knew this was being used for repression." Over several hours of free-ranging debate on the topic between Holly and the young guerrillas guarding him, the American came to face his nation's culpability for how Guatemalan officers had been using their guns

and training. "I think that what we have got to look at here," Holly testified subsequently, "is the whole view of theirs that we are responsible for police repression, and police ill-treatment of prisoners and for military repression. It does, at least in my mind, raise the question of our moral responsibility for this."[103]

In May 1970, after reading an embassy report on the Ojo por Ojo death squad's murders of several leftists—in which it was noted that Ojo por Ojo was made up primarily of members of SCUGA, which had worked closely with the PN under Sosa—one U.S. official scrawled in the margins of the report, "This is what we were afraid of with increased Public Safety support."[104] These voices of doubt within the U.S. advisory corps were important for two reasons: first, because they showed that there were indeed dissenters within the diplomatic community, and second, because they demonstrated that OPS officials cannot claim to have been oblivious to their efforts' bloody consequences. It was now obvious to all that the greatest danger to "peace and tranquility" came not from the Left but from the extreme Right, and USAID was helping to foot the bill.

ENDGAME

USAID allocated nearly a million dollars in police aid that year, to say nothing of the larger amounts being funneled into the military by other agencies. The agency committed itself to funding a new police training academy and also continued with its regular invitation of selected officials to the International Police Academy in Washington, DC, for instruction in operations planning, investigation, public relations, control of civic disturbances, marksmanship, transit control, and narcotics investigation.[105] The idea, charitably interpreted, was that by funding the academy and training the officers who would become its teachers, the OPS would be encouraging the development of civilian policing, inculcating in a generation of PN agents a well-rounded, ethical conception of a police officer's duties.

But, as usual, police and military leadership took the funds and training and adapted them to their own priorities. At the local police academy in 1970, only 100 officers were trained in "Basic Policing" and 196 in "Driving," while 393 were trained in "Riot Control and Use of Chemical Agents," 797 in "Target Shooting with the .38 Crossman and .38 Special Revolvers," and 1,200 in "Military Corps and Section Instruction."[106] Some products of U.S. assistance would indeed have improved civil investigations—particularly the establishment of a fingerprinting bureau, which was upgraded under U.S. supervision to the modern "Henry" system of fingerprint recording and analysis from the

Vucetich system previously in use—had civil investigations been the Guatemalan state's main priority.[107] (Others were harder to explain, such as the PN's 1971 decision, pushed by AID's Arlen W. Gee, to require all Guatemalans applying for their required *cedula* identification cards to have their fingerprints taken and entered into the force's databases, thus growing the archive of individuals' files enormously.)[108] And neither, frankly, was civil investigation the Americans' priority. Contemporaneously, a U.S. consultant advised hiring a full-time weapons technician to advise the PN in firearm use and help the Guatemalans increase their "hit capabilities."[109]

The OPS and USAID continued funding the PN despite its violations of its civilian mandate because, at the end of the day, the Arana regime was accomplishing U.S. goals, if with unsavory methods. And not every U.S. official had come around, like Vaky or Holly, to adjusting his cost-benefit analysis when it came to collateral damage. In July 1970, USAID director Robert Cuthbertson claimed that the Guatemalan Left was composed of "hard-core communist terrorists who are criminally oriented and love guns, love to kill." When questioned by fellow staffers about whether the United States should associate with a regime that so privileged security buildup over socioeconomic development, Cuthbertson offered a strident defense of Arana's development plans, presaging Ronald Reagan's famous "bum rap" comment about Ríos Montt fifteen years later.[110] Most advisers simply accepted the assertion that violence was being generated in equal measure by the extreme Left and the extreme Right.[111]

In the meantime, however, evidence abounded that U.S. allies were using U.S. taxpayer dollars to attack unarmed progressive sectors. In October 1971, the Ojo por Ojo death squad threatened the life of university rector Rafael Cuevas del Cid; U.S. officials knew that the government itself was behind the threats.[112] (Cuevas del Cid would later lose his son and daughter-in-law to state violence.) On 26 September 1972, Arana's security forces, in this case mostly PN agents, captured half of the PGT's Central Committee, making martyrs of Bernardo Alvarado Monzón, Hugo Barrios Klee, Mario Silva Jonama, and five others. The leaders were captured during a meeting in a private home and taken to the headquarters of the Detective Corps; they were never seen again. Shortly after the incident, the FAR kidnapped PN detective Abel Juárez Villatoro and forced him to sign a statement revealing the details of the operation. The eight prisoners had been captured by the clandestine operations team of Detective Corps subchief Arnolfo Argueta and turned over to the Fourth Corps' infamous chief, Juan Antonio "El Chino" Lima López, to be tortured and killed. As embassy documents indicate, "Police sources privately con-

firmed to us that the statement was essentially true."[113] And in late 1972, a new death squad appeared: Buitre Justiciero (Avenging Vulture), a front for the police elimination of common criminals.[114] In response to an internal report in October 1972 suggesting that a "Special Action Unit" had been formed within the National Police "to assume death squad functions," USAID director Byron Engle noted, without any apparent irony, that the news was "disturbing," and that "the time for stopping something like this from developing is before it gets started."[115]

Yet OPS advisers were not blind to the problem of state terror. A 1972 memo notes that the PSP's "major issue #1" moving forward was, "How can the [U.S. government] best assist the [government of Guatemala] to keep insurgency in check, while at the same time encouraging it to minimize use of illegal methods and use of repression against non-insurgents?"[116] But the National Security Council's Country Analysis Strategy Paper (CASP) for Guatemala in the 1973–1974 fiscal year clearly stated U.S. priorities. Security aid was designed "to assist the armed force and police to develop as rapidly as possible internal security capabilities sufficient to deal with the threat posed by violent opposition from the left," and "to enable the United States to maintain influence in the [Guatemalan] military establishment." (The next paragraph clarified some of the reasons for the U.S. investment in Guatemalan pacification, relating to the purchase of Guatemala's electrical company and to disputed trade and resource extraction deals involving the nickel-mining outfit EXMIBAL, the United Fruit Company, PanAm, and International Railways of Central America.)[117] The CASP suggested that the United States "discreetly use its influence" to discourage the Guatemalan state from committing extrajudicial executions but provided no clarity on how to obtain results, given that elsewhere it acknowledged that the United States' ability "to influence the political behavior of key power groups" was "marginal." The CASP provided only slight evidence, a trend projection measured according to "the Embassy's admittedly far from perfect index," for a claim that would release the United States from moral compromise: "We believe the GOG involvement in extralegal activity will decline."[118]

If U.S. officials were not acting, beyond privately suggesting to the Guatemalans that they be mindful of their growing image problem, international organizations began to take notice. In February 1971, Amnesty International first raised the "disappearances and murders of the opposition" of the Arana government with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, submitting documentation on hundreds of cases of "extralegal detention and disappearance." In December of the same year, the Latin American Studies Association

passed a resolution condemning U.S. support for "semi-official and official rightist terror in Guatemala," singling out police and military aid programs as signifying U.S. complicity in repression.[119] Also in 1971, the U.S. House of Representatives made early forays into what soon became a larger conversation. A staff report on Guatemala and the Dominican Republic, evaluating the effectiveness of U.S. security assistance, noted that this aid's real impact was to legitimize state terror. "The argument in favor of the public safety program in Guatemala," the report noted, "is that if we don't teach the cops to be good, who will? The argument against it is that after 14 years, on all evidence, the teaching hasn't been absorbed. Furthermore, the U.S. is politically identified with police terrorism."[120]

By the early 1970s, the relationship of U.S. aid to police terrorism was being debated in a global context.[121] In 1969, the International Commission of Jurists charged that up to twelve thousand people were being held as political prisoners in the makeshift jails of Brazil's da Costa e Silva dictatorship, and in 1970 the *Washington Post* editorialized that there were "too many reports by too many reliable witnesses . . . about the torturing of 'subversives' for anyone to doubt that it goes on" in Brazil.[122] Senator Frank Church opened a Senate Committee on Foreign Relations investigation into U.S. police aid to Brazil in 1970; journalists Jack Anderson and Joseph Spear ran an investigative series disclosing CIA ties to the OPS, denouncing violence committed by OPS-backed foreign security forces, and calling for the program's abolition.[123] South Vietnam was another flash point, as regular reports of torture and murder committed by U.S.-supervised South Vietnamese police sparked further outrage.[124] By the time Greek director Costa-Gavras's film *State of Siege* (1973), which depicted the Tupamaros' kidnapping and murder of USAID counterinsurgency trainer Dan Mitrione, was nominated for a Golden Globe, Congress was ready to act. *State of Siege* ignited a firestorm among lawmakers, dramatizing U.S. involvement with Uruguay's police torturers and offering a strong denunciation of the International Police Academy, the OPS, and the entire principle of U.S. collaboration with dictatorships abroad. By 1973, the evidence and bad publicity could not be ignored. Senator James Abourezk (D-ND) met with political prisoners and conducted investigations that revealed, among other pieces of information, that the OPS had funded South Vietnam's infamous "tiger cage" cells, in which prisoners were hung from their arms in body-sized underground cages.[125]

Abourezk led the charge on two amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, prohibiting foreign police assistance (1973) and banning any U.S. training of foreign intelligence services (1974). The Office of Public Safety,

which had "trained" more than one million police officers worldwide, was dismantled in 1974.[126] In his presentation to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Abourezk decried how "this country is involved in an activity which is totally divorced from the scope and intention of U.S. foreign aid. The Office of Public Safety and the International Police Academy mocks the purpose of other USAID programs and has inflicted an indelible blemish" on U.S. credibility worldwide.[127] An era had ended, though not soon enough. In many cases, however, the taboo police assistance was merely rebranded as counternarcotics assistance, which, as historian Jeremy Kuzmarov writes, employed many former OPS personnel. (One Special Forces officer, dispatched to Colombia with a counternarcotics training team during the 1980s, reported: "The training that I conducted was anything but counter-narcotics. It was updated Vietnam-style counter-insurgency, but we were told to refer to it as counter-narcotics should anyone ask.")[128] This dynamic would evolve into the hemispheric "War on Drugs," but before that, its effects would continue to be felt in Guatemala.

THE WAGES OF COUNTERINSURGENCY

In 1974, after Congress settled the question, the OPS conducted a phaseout study assessing the Public Safety Program's impact on Guatemalan policing over the course of its nearly twenty years. It noted the following achievements: streamlining the PN from sixty-six operational units down to thirty-four, establishing La Regional, standardizing vehicles and armaments, institutionalizing riot control techniques, improving the archiving of personal identification files on more than one million citizens in a country of about eight million, building a new training academy, and convincing the Guatemalans to properly maintain their new vehicles. Over the course of the program, USAID directly invested $4.5 million in training, commodities, and advising for the PN, making Guatemala's police assistance program among its largest—to say nothing of indirect investments in, for example, the training of the army generals who would run the PN throughout the war.[129] In addition, USAID trained more than four hundred Guatemalan police at the International Police Academy and more than three thousand more in-country.[130] Indeed, technical improvements were made in the PN's civil policing capacities. But AID's primary impact on the PN was not the result of weapons shipments, uniforms, or traffic management instruction. What McClintock notes about U.S. aid's principal effect on the military also holds true for the police: "The U.S. security assistance program's introduction of sophisticated wherewithal for sowing the 'counter-terror,' such as computers, submachine guns, or helicopters was, in

its influence on events, secondary to the Guatemalan military's whole-hearted adoption of the U.S. doctrine that it is correct and necessary for governments to resort to terrorism in the pursuit of certain ends."[131]

This would prove to be the only message that stuck. When U.S. advisers first arrived, they noted that the PN's operational capacities were woefully deficient. Indeed, as Fimbres's initial report indicated, the National Police was "acutely geared to security against subversive activity and communist attack, with the primary police function taking a secondary role." The following major problem areas identified by Fimbres in 1956 were:

> A lack of professional training, unwieldy spans of control, absence of good executive management, poor budgeting practices, poor personnel administration coupled with lack of concept of human relations in management, very low morale and esprit de corps, improper deployment of line personnel, lack of adequate and centralized police records, inadequate office and housing facilities, and lack of preventive maintenance and care of motorized equipment.[132]

Assistance from USAID did achieve modest improvements in some of these fields. But in their more honest moments, PSP personnel conceded that the training in civil policing was not taking hold. Instead, what USAID intervention accomplished was to make the Guatemalans see how its long-neglected "primary police functions"—better archives, modern equipment, vehicle maintenance, professional training, and improved personnel administration—were, in fact, *not separate* from the struggle against subversion. Rather, as OPS advisers instructed their counterparts, the struggle against subversion could be best carried out *only once* these primary functions, seen by the Armas-era leadership as low-priority pencil-pushing, were optimized.

Likewise, when the ICA first began to assess the PN, it took note of the mistrust and lack of collaboration between different security forces and intelligence groups. With U.S. assistance, particularly in constructing the technical means enabling interagency coordination, antisubversive operations were consolidated under military control, with specialized PN cadres integrated into a new executive hierarchy of terror. Staffers from OPS, who manned desks in PN headquarters, instructed police and military officers in the benefits of collaboration, systematizing intelligence, and maintaining the tools necessary (vehicles, files, guns) to get the job done. U.S. advisers rarely attempted to "curb the excesses" they observed in the process—and in which they at times participated directly—at any point during the Public Safety Program's twenty years, even as they were uncomfortable with the extrajudicial uses of what

Thomas Lobe calls U.S. "social control aid."[133] As embassy chief of mission Vaky wrote after leaving his post in 1968, "We have not been honest with ourselves. We *have* condoned counter-terror; we may even in effect have encouraged or blessed it. We have been so obsessed with the fear of insurgency that we have rationalized away our qualms and uneasiness. This is not only because we have concluded we cannot do anything about it, for we never really tried."[134]

The United States did not invent political polarization, class struggle, or police brutality in Guatemala. However, in their quest to maintain U.S. influence, protect U.S. business interests, and contain global "communism," Public Safety Program advisers abetted and encouraged domestic elites' efforts to obliterate any voices calling for change in society. As Stephen Streeter writes, for the highest echelons of Guatemala's power structure, "the communist threat was in fact a rationalization for bolstering the armed forces against a popular revolution against the oligarchy."[135] Even John Longan agreed. "It seems evident," he wrote, that the Guatemalan security forces "will continue to be used, as in the past, not so much as the protectors of the nation against communist enslavement, but as the oligarchy's oppressors of legitimate social change."[136]

As we shall see in the next chapter, the habits established during the Public Safety years died hard. Specialized PN units, under the direction of a U.S.-fortified military intelligence, continued their frontline involvement not only against the insurgency but also in the suppression of a broader social world based primarily in Guatemala City: trade unionists, students, professors, the urban intelligentsia, the press, and a growing chorus of human rights activists pushed to risky speech by the tortured bodies turning up in the city's gutters and ravines. Thousands of these people never reappeared, damning their loved ones to indefinitely suspend the grieving process while hoping against hope—and against the odds—that their family members would one day return. One of the best known of these *desaparecidos* was Víctor Manuel Gutiérrez, the PGT Central Committee secretary-general kidnapped during the March 1966 raids and then tortured to death.[137] The Project for the Recovery of the National Police Historical Archives cautiously began to reveal some early discoveries to the media in 2006 and 2007; one of the first documents it shared with the public was Gutiérrez's personal file, which was annotated to read, "#1 Communist of Guatemala."[138]

Gutiérrez's file spoke eloquently to the importance of archives in the counterinsurgency campaign. Though the PN had long maintained surveillance records, the filing system it used in the lead-up to the March 1966 disappear-

ances was the result of records management training initiated in 1957 and 1958, wherein U.S. advisers set up a "Records Room," filled it with filing cabinets and supplies purchased by the Public Safety Program, and conducted daily training sessions in record keeping for their Guatemalan students. U.S. influence over the PN's archival practice extended to the very size of Gutiérrez's file card and the categories of information it collected about him—his physical characteristics, address, family members, movements inside and outside the country.[139] Moreover, Gutiérrez had been one of the Arbenz-era Communist Party members included in the first blacklist assembled by CIA operatives and handed over to Castillo Armas in the aftermath of Arbenz's ouster. As such, Gutiérrez's personal file, the first of many thousands to eventually be revealed by the Project, stands as a documentary artifact not only of political repression but also of the profoundly important and often neglected role of archives in processes of social control—the relationship of knowledge to power. The National Police archives, which reveal the dark nature of the PN's institutional history beyond a shadow of a doubt, have this and many other stories to tell.

NOTES

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

1. Saramago, *All the Names*, 4–5.

INTRODUCTION

1. The National Police (PN) was disbanded under the Peace Accords and replaced with the National Civil Police (PNC).

2. Interview, PRAHPN024, 5 December 2007.

3. The archives contain an estimated seventy-five to eighty million pages. See Procuraduría de los Derechos Humanos (PDH), "Informe Archivo Histórico de la Policía Nacional—por el derecho a la verdad" (2 March 2006).

4. Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico (CEH), *Guatemala: Memoria del silencio*.

5. "Discurso del Profesor Julio Alberto Martí," in Ministerio de Gobernación, *Boletín del Archivo General de la Nación* (1967).

6. As of this writing, the cases of Julian Assange and Chelsea Manning are paramount in the public eye, but there have been others, and there will be many more.

7. Thompson, *The Poverty of Theory*, 11.

8. Trouillot, *Silencing the Past*, 150.

9. On the war, see Proyecto Interdiocesano de Recuperación de la Memoria Histórica (REMHI), *Guatemala: Nunca Más!*; Rosada Granados, *Soldados en el poder*; McAllister, *The Good Road*; Simon, *Eternal Spring, Eternal Tyranny*; Falla, *Masacres en la selva* and *Quiché Rebelde*; Jonas, *The Battle for Guatemala*; Flores, *Los compañeros*; Ramírez, *La guerra de los 36 años*; Schirmer, *The Guatemalan Military Project*; Grandin, *The Last Colonial Massacre*; Payeras, *Los días de la selva*; Manz, *Refugees of a Hidden War*; Bastos and Camus, *Sombras de una batalla*; Moller and Menchú Tum, *Our Culture Is Our Resistance*; Filóchofo, *La otra historia*; Gallardo Flores, *La utopia de la rosa*; Centro de Investigación y Documentación Centroamericana (CIDC), *Violencia y contraviolencia*; Sánchez del Valle, ed., *Por el delito de pensar*; Sichar Moreno, *Guatemala*; García, *El genocidio de Guatemala*.

10. Tomuschat, "Clarification Commission in Guatemala," 233–58. Investigators for the CEH were allowed into the Center for Military Studies to hand-transcribe four key military action plans; no access was provided to PN documents.

11. Alberti, "Archives of Pain."

12. Jelin, *State Repression*, 27.

13. For example, the 1968 poster "Red Wall" displayed the photographs of fifteen accused guerrillas along with these words: "People of Guatemala! Here are your *vendepatria* [sellout] enemies, Communists from the PGT and the FAR, who with their crimes

daily bring mourning to the hearths of the Homeland. Know them and denounce them wherever they are found!" CEH, *Guatemala: Memoria del silencio*, vol. 1, appendix 18, 285.

14. In his "Theses on the Philosophy of History," Benjamin writes, "The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the 'emergency situation' in which we live is the rule. We must arrive at a concept of history which corresponds to this. Then it will become clear that the task before us is the introduction of a real state of emergency; and our position in the struggle against Fascism will thereby improve." In Benjamin, *Illuminations*, 253–64.

15. See Centro Internacional de Investigaciones en Derechos Humanos (CIIDH), *Situación de los derechos económicos, sociales, y culturales en Guatemala, 2006*; Impunity Watch, *Recognising the Past*; Programa de Seguridad Ciudadana y Prevención de la Violencia, *Informe estadístico de la violencia en Guatemala*.

16. International Crisis Group, "Learning to Walk without a Crutch."

17. Nelson, *A Finger in the Wound*; Sánchez del Valle, ed., *Por el delito de pensar*; Amnesty International, *Persecution and Resistance*; United Nations Office of the High Commission for Human Rights, "Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in Guatemala," 1–21; Coalición para la Comisión de Investigación de Cuerpos Ilegales y Aparatos Clandestinos y de Seguridad, "El rostro del terror"; Goldman, *The Art of Political Murder;* Oglesby, "Educating Citizens in Postwar Guatemala."

18. The United Nations' International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) has taken up this question, but the intractability of corruption and "parallel powers" has made its progress slower than hoped. Carlos Castresana, the CICIG's first director, admitted the occasional temptation to throw in the towel. "For these kinds of missions," he told reporters, "you just have to come without a towel." Coralia Orantes, "Critica falta de atención a propuesta," *Prensa Libre* (19 February 2010). Also see Peacock and Beltrán, *Poderes ocultos*; United Nations Development Program, *El costo económico*.

19. McCleary, *Dictating Democracy.*

20. CIIDH, *Situación de los Derechos, 2006*; State Department, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, *2008 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Guatemala*.

21. In speaking of two distinct historical "moments" or periods, I do not mean to draw an artificial boundary between them or suggest that the archives' uses were static in those moments. Rather, I use the continuity and change in the conditions of the archives as an analytical entry point to studying continuity and change in the broader Guatemalan context. As E. P. Thompson writes, "In investigating history we are not flicking through a series of 'stills,' each of which shows us a moment of social time transfixed into a single eternal pose: for each one of these 'stills' is not only a moment of being but also a moment of becoming: and even within each seemingly-static section there will be found contradictions and liaisons, dominant and subordinate elements, declining or ascending energies. Any historical moment is both a result of prior process and an index toward the direction of its future flow." Thompson, *The Poverty of Theory*, 64.

22. Trouillot calls these two meanings "historicity 1" and "historicity 2." Trouillot, *Silencing the Past*, 29.

23. See www.avemilgua.org.

24. Fujino, ed., *Winds of Resistance*.

25. These observations come from my visit to the festival in 2007.

26. McCreery, *Rural Guatemala 1760–1940*; McCreery, "Wage Labor, Free Labor"; Handy, *Gift of the Devil*; Casaús Arzú, *Guatemala*; Smith, ed., *Guatemalan Indians and the State*; Grandin, *The Blood of Guatemala*; Lovell, *A Beauty That Hurts*; Martínez Peláez, *La patria del criollo*; Arenas Bianchi, Hale, and Palma Murga, eds., *Racismo en Guatemala?*

27. On the 1944 Revolution and the Revolutionary Spring, see Galich, *Del panico al ataque*; Flores, *Fortuny*; Handy, *Revolution in the Countryside*; Grandin, *The Last Colonial Massacre*; Cardoza y Aragón, *La revolución guatemalteca*; García Laguardia, *La revolución*.

28. On the coup, see Cullather, *Secret History*; Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*; Immerman, *The* CIA *in Guatemala*; Kinzer and Schlesinger, *Bitter Fruit*.

29. Sabino, *Guatemala*; CEH, "Orígenes del enfrentamiento armado, 1962–1970," in *Guatemala: Memoria del silencio*, vol. 1, 123–146; Rosada Granados, *Soldados en el poder*; Ramírez, *La guerra de los 36 años*; Sandoval, *Los días de la resistencia*; Maldonado, "Marzo y abril de 1962"; Toriello Garrido, *Guatemala*.

30. Many of the insurgency's surviving leaders wrote memoirs about the war and the ideological divides within the revolutionary movements. See Payeras, *Los días de la selva* and *Los fusiles de octubre*; Morán (Ramírez de León), *Saludos revolucionarios*; Macías, *La guerrilla fue mi camino*; Colom, *Mujeres en la alborada*.

31. URNG, *Línea política de los revolucionarios guatemaltecos*.

32. Kobrak, *Organizing and Repression*; Aguilera Peralta and Romero Imery, *Dialéctica del terror*; Levenson-Estrada, *Trade Unionists*; Asociación de Investigación y Estudios Sociales en Guatemala (ASIES), *Más de cien años*, vol. 2; Figueroa Ibarra, *El recurso del miedo*; McClintock, *The American Connection.*

33. CEH, *Guatemala: Memoria del silencio*; REMHI, *Guatemala: Nunca Más!*; Figueroa Ibarra, *Los que siempre estarán en ninguna parte*.

34. Hernández Pico, *Terminar la guerra*; Sáenz de Tejada, *Revolucionarios*; Armon et al., *Guatemala 1983–1997;* Rosada Granados, *El lado oculto*; Aguilera Peralta, *Las propuestas para la paz*; Jonas, *Of Centaurs and Doves*; Stanley and Holiday, "Broad Participation, Diffuse Responsibility"; Sieder et al., *Who Governs*; Schirmer, "The Guatemalan Politico-Military Project."

35. On the solidarity movement, see Smith, *Resisting Reagan*; Erickson Nepstad, *Convictions of the Soul*; Gosse, "Active Engagement"; Perla, "Si Nicaragua Venció."

36. Despite anthropologist David Stoll's efforts to undermine the narrative that Rigoberta Menchú Tum recounted to Elisabeth Burgos-Debray and published as *Me llamo Rigoberta Menchú y así me nació la conciencia*, Menchú's account remains the most influential account of the war. Her book was used as an advocacy tool to draw attention to the Guatemalan state's mass killings of Mayas; Menchú was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1992. See Arias, ed., *The Rigoberta Menchú Controversy*; Stoll, *Rigoberta Menchú and the Story of All Poor Guatemalans*.

37. As Greg Grandin asks, "Does labeling the massacres *genocide* overshadow the fact that the state was being challenged by a powerful, multiethnic coalition demanding economic and political reform? Does the charge of genocide eclipse the destruction and violence inflicted on *ladinos* (Guatemalans not considered indigenous), who until 1981 constituted the majority of the victims of state repression? Likewise, does it overstate the racial dimensions of the insurgency while downplaying its class component? Does it deny indigenous participation in the popular movement and reduce the repression to a

simplified tale of *ladino* violence heaped on defenseless Indians?" Grandin, "Chronicles," 399. For more on the "genocide" label's complexities, see Garrard-Burnett, *Terror in the Land of the Holy Spirit*, 13–18.

38. For an incisive exegesis of these politics, see McAllister, "Good People."

39. These scholars include (but are not limited to) McAllister, Konefal, Oglesby, Garrard-Burnett, Manz, Falla, Schirmer, Nelson, Grandin, and Vela Castañeda, as well as the many Guatemalans at research organizations like AVANCSO (Asociación para el Avance de las Ciencias Sociales de Guatemala), ICCPG (Instituto de Estudios Comparados en Ciencias Penales de Guatemala) and FLACSO (Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales de Guatemala).

40. Notable exceptions are Kobrak, *Organizing and Repression*; Levenson-Estrada, *Trade Unionists*; and McClintock, *The American Connection*.

41. On the Pan-Maya movement, its advances, and the "neoliberal multiculturalism" that has been its unexpected result, see Hale, *Más Que Un Indio*; Warren, *Indigenous Movements*; Fischer and Brown, eds., *Maya Cultural Activism*; Bastos and Camus, *El movimiento maya*; Cojtí Cuxil, *El movimiento maya*.

42. See, for example, Payeras, *El trueno en la ciudad*.

43. Kobrak, *Organizing and Repression*, 68–69.

44. I borrow this formulation from Derrida, who writes in *Archive Fever* that "what is no longer archived in the same way is no longer lived in the same way."

45. The phrase "archival thinking" finds use mainly by professional archivists as a way of describing current trends in their field, such as in the journal *Currents of Archival Thinking*. Here, however, I borrow and adapt the phrase to analytical ends. The phrase also appears in Strobel's 1999 article "Becoming a Historian," as a way for Strobel to describe how crucial it is that activists keep records of their work. Archival thinking is not developed conceptually in her piece; her point that activists must self-archive is taken up by Bickford in "The Archival Imperative."

46. See, for example, Stoler, "Colonial Archives"; Trouillot, *Silencing the Past*; Ketelaar, "Muniments and Monuments"; Ketelaar, "Tacit Narratives"; Bickford, "The Archival Imperative"; Huskamp Peterson, "The Role of Archives in Strengthening Democracy"; Fredriksson, "Postmodernistic Archival Science."

47. See the essays in the special issues of *Archival Science* devoted to the theme "Archives, Records, and Power," including Cook and Schwartz, "Archives, Records, and Power"; Trace, "What Is Recorded Is Never Simply 'What Happened'"; Hedstrom, "Archives, Memory, and Interfaces with the Past"; Ketelaar, "Archival Temples, Archival Prisons"; and O'Toole, "Cortes's Notary."

48. Huskamp Peterson, "The Nasty Truth about Nationalism"; also see Lowenthal, *The Heritage Crusade*; O'Toole, "Between Veneration and Loathing"; Cook, "What Is Past Is Prologue"; Duchein, "The History of European Archives"; Lowenthal, *The Past Is a Foreign Country*; Brown and Davis-Brown, "The Making of Memory."

49. See Nelson, *Reckoning*, 27; Strathern, *Audit Cultures*; Power, *The Audit Society*; Hetherington, *Guerrilla Auditors*.

50. On the Guatemalan case, see chapter 4; also see Huggins, *Political Policing*; and Kuzmarov, *Modernizing Repression*.

51. Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain*, 33.

60. Huskamp Peterson, "Records of the Policía Nacional de Guatemala," 10.

61. Interview, PRAHPN022.

62. Interview, PRAHPN003.

63. Rachel Donadio writes, "Access to archives is a barometer of any government's commitment to transparency." Rachel Donadio, "The Iron Archives," *New York Times* (22 April 2007).

64. Interview, PRAHPN004.

65. Interview, Estuardo Galeano.

66. On impunity in Guatemala, see Impunity Watch, *Recognising the Past*.

67. Interview, PRAHPN007.

68. Cited in Paul Jeffrey, "Secret Files Open Window on Guatemala's Violent Past," *National Catholic Reporter* (3 August 2007).

69. Cited in Ginger Thompson, "Mildewed Police Files May Hold Clues to Atrocities in Guatemala," *New York Times* (21 November 2005).

70. On this, see Ketelaar, "Recordkeeping and Societal Power."

71. Interview, PRAHPN010.

72. For "parallel powers," see Peacock and Beltrán, *Poderes ocultos*.

73. As Andrzej Rzeplinski writes, "One should realize that the temptation to use archival resources of the [defunct] security services for further repressive purposes may emerge any time, should the rule of law ever get overthrown. . . . such documents may always turn up as instruments of blackmail or other lawlessness." Rzeplinski, "Habeas Data."

FOUR. BUILDING COUNTERINSURGENCY ARCHIVES

1. On Arbenz's fall, see Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*; Cullather, *Secret History*; Kinzer and Schlesinger, *Bitter Fruit*.

2. International Cooperation Administration (ICA), "Report on the National Police of Guatemala," Washington, DC, 9 April 1956, DNSA, GU00019.

3. ICA, "Report on the National Police of Guatemala." In fact, Castillo Armas's envoy to the ICA had already lamented the "absence of a central filing system to which the Government could turn for rapid information." U.S. Embassy in Guatemala (USE/G) to U.S. Secretary of State (SecState), "Guatemalan Request for Technical Assistance in Intelligence," 18 August 1955, NACP, RG 286, Office of Public Safety (OPS), Latin America Branch (LAB), Country File: Guatemala (CF:G), Box 65, Folder IPS 1/General/Guatemala.

4. ICA, "Report on the National Police of Guatemala."

5. ICA, "Report on the National Police of Guatemala." He notes that the Sección de Defensa Contra el Comunismo had processed 600,000 records without a single lost file—this after only two years in existence, and in a country with a population of only 3.2 million.

6. ICA, "Report on the National Police of Guatemala."

7. ICA, "Reply to November and December Public Safety Reports," Washington, DC, 13 January 1959, NACP, RG 286, OPS, LAB, CF:G, Box 68, Folder IPS 2–2/Monthly Reports /Guatemala.

8. United States Operations Mission to Guatemala (USOM/G), "Recent Activities of Public Safety Program, Guatemala," 8 September 1958, NACP, RG 286, OPS, LAB, CF:G, Box 69, Folder IPS 2–3/Programs/Guatemala 2.

9. ICA, "Reply to November and December Public Safety Reports."

10. Rubottom to Atwood, "Overseas Internal Security Program," 3 June 1957, NACP, RG 286, OPS, LAB, CF:G, Box 69, Folder IPS 2–3/Programs/Guatemala 2.

11. There is but one substantive account of the U.S. role in shaping the ragtag PN into a counterinsurgent force; though excellent, it is more than twenty-five years old, and many government documents have been declassified since. McClintock, *The American Connection*.

12. The CEH ruled that only the 1981–1983 period, in four rural departments, could be termed "genocide." CEH, *Guatemala: Memoria del silencio*.

13. USAID Bureau on Latin America, "Use of Firearms by the National Police of Guatemala," 28 March 1962, DNSA, GU00077.

14. For the United States' use of similar tactics in the Philippines, see McCoy, *Policing America's Empire*, 61.

15. Kuzmarov, "Modernizing Repression." See also Langguth, *Hidden Terrors*; McCoy, *Policing America's Empire*; and Huggins, "U.S. Supported State Terror."

16. Huggins, *Political Policing*, 60.

17. Lobe, "The Rise and Demise," 190. On the institutional evolution that led to the creation of USAID, see Huggins, *Political Policing*.

18. REA/Williams to U/NSA/Mr. de Lima, "Overseas Internal Security Program—Guatemala," 26 April 1957, NACP, RG 286, OPS, LAB, CF:G, Box 69, Folder IPS 2–3/Programs /Guatemala 2.

19. USOM/G, "Recent Activities of Public Safety Program, Guatemala," 8 September 1958, NACP, RG 286, OPS, LAB, CF:G, Box 69, Folder: IPS 2–3/Programs/Guatemala 2.

20. Huggins, *Political Policing*, 79.

21. Huggins, *Political Policing*, 81.

22. For "exotic horrors," see *Orden—Organo de la Policía Nacional de la República de Guatemala, C.A.* (24 September 1955), CIRMA. Siekmeier notes that communism, "in the argot of U.S. officialdom, clearly was a more inclusive term than simply rule by a Marxist-Leninist regime or a Soviet-backed or Soviet-dominated government," and suggests that the primary U.S. objective in the Americas was the containment of all forms of economic nationalism. Siekmeier, *Aid*, 164.

23. USE/G to SecState, "Guatemalan Request for Technical Assistance in Intelligence," 18 August 1955, NACP, RG 286, OPS, LAB, CF:G, Box 65, Folder: IPS 1/General/Guatemala.

24. McClintock, *The American Connection*, 29. McClintock notes that although many were detained, probably only three hundred leftists were killed in the aftermath of the coup, and that such relative "softness" compared to the post-1960s can be explained by the fact that "in 1954 there was neither an apparatus, nor a counter-insurgency orientation encouraging wholesale murder along modern lines" (30).

25. McClintock, *The American Connection*, 35; and Doyle, "The Art of the Coup."

26. USE/G to SecState, "Guatemalan Request for Technical Assistance in Intelligence," 18 August 1955, NACP, RG 286, OPS, LAB, CF:G, Box 65, Folder: IPS 1/General/Guatemala.

27. Decree-Law 553, cited in Contreras Cruz and Sinay Álvarez, "Historia de la Policía Nacional de Guatemala 1881–1997," 65. The General Directorate of National Security was created because the Committee against Communism's mandate put it into conflict with the new 1956 Constitution, particularly concerning the permitted length of preven-

tive detentions. The committee had come under fire from labor unions, who asserted that the workers being arrested by the committee were innocents being denounced by employers for engaging in legal union activities. The Committee against Communism's name switch was only one of many such cosmetic changes by security forces during the war; any time that a group's extralegal methods attracted excessive attention, its agents were recycled into a new group with a new moniker. See William B. Connett Jr. to State Department (DOS), "Establishment of General Office of National Security," Guatemala City, 6 March 1956, DNSA, GU00018.

28. AHPN, *Del silencio a la memoria*, 47.

29. ICA, "Report on the National Police of Guatemala."

30. D. L. Crisostomo, "Briefing Report for the Washington Evaluation Team on the Public Safety Program in Guatemala," 23 October 1964, NSA, McClintock Collection, Box 4, Folder: Guatemala Evaluation of OPS 1961–69.

31. AHPN, *Del silencio a la memoria*, 479–505.

32. USOM/G, "Recent Activities of Public Safety Program, Guatemala," 8 September 1958, NACP, RG 286, OPS, LAB, CF:G, Box 69, Folder: IPS 2–3/Programs/Guatemala 2. On Piloña's comments, see "Hoy Asume Casado la Policía," *El Imparcial*, 17 July 1958.

33. ICA to USE/G, "Reply to August Public Safety Report," Washington, DC, 29 September 1959, NACP, RG 286, OPS, LAB, CF:G, Box 68, Folder: IPS 2–2/Monthly Reports /Guatemala.

34. USOM/G to ICA, "Special Police Investigation Services," Guatemala City, 25 August 1960, DNSA, GU00032.

35. This dovetailed with Kennedy's expansion of the USAID police assistance program worldwide; see Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World*.

36. USOM/G to ICA, "Special Police Investigation Services."

37. USOM/G to ICA, "Special Police Investigation Services."

38. AHPN, *Del silencio a la memoria*, 51.

39. AHPN, *Del silencio a la memoria*, 280.

40. AHPN, *Del silencio a la memoria*, 50–52.

41. For Ubico's "auxiliary army," see Crisostomo, "Briefing Report," 23 October 1964. McClintock notes that Ubico's secret police were by far the most effective state security force at the time—more so than the military, which played a secondary role in internal security until the 1960s. See McClintock, *The American Connection*, 18.

42. Interview, PRAHPN018.

43. USE/G to DOS, 24 August 1966, NACP, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files 1964–1966, Box 2253, Folder: POL 23—Guat—1/1/66.

44. For "common thug and assassin," see AID Bureau on Latin America, "Use of Firearms by the National Police of Guatemala."

45. "Ningún vestigio: Judiciales se llevaron instrumentos de tortura," *El Imparcial*, 7 July 1966. *Gamexán* (alternately spelled as *gamesán* or gamezan) was an insecticide used in the torture practice of "hooding," in which interrogators covered victims' heads with a rubber hood impregnated with the poison. McClintock, *The American Connection*, 119n105.

46. Crisostomo, "Briefing Report," 23 October 1964.

47. Schirmer, *The Guatemalan Military Project*, 157.

48. “Policía: Gobierno elimina el departamento judicial,” *El Imparcial*, 1 November 1966.

49. All citations in this paragraph from AID Bureau on Latin America, “Use of Firearms by the National Police of Guatemala.”

50. The Days of March and April reflected momentum built up by strikes in 1960 and 1961, and absent brutal repression could well have resulted in Ydígoras’s overthrow. See Ramírez, *La guerra de los 36 años*; and Rosada Granados, *Soldados en el poder*.

51. “Academia de la Guardia Judicial,” *Orden: Organo de la Policía Nacional de Guatemala*, Tomo II, Segunda Epoca, No. 2 (Guatemala City: 1960), 18, CIRMA: Colección de Documentos.

52. Jonas, “Dangerous Liaisons,” 146.

53. CIA Directorate of Intelligence (CIA/DOI), “Intelligence Handbook for Special Operations: Guatemala,” Washington, DC (June 1967), 166, NACP, CIA-CREST Database.

54. USE/G to SecState, 24 September 1963, NACP, RG 286, OPS, LAB, CF:G, Box 65, Folder: IPS 1/General/Guatemala.

55. Byron Engle to David Laughlin, “Program Adequacy Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Venezuela,” 1 April 1964, DNSA, GU00170.

56. D. L. Crisostomo, “Report on Police Progress and Development in Guatemala,” Guatemala City, January 1965, NSA/GDP.

57. CIA/DOI, “Guatemala—A Current Appraisal,” 8 October 1966, DDRS.

58. Grandin, *The Last Colonial Massacre*, 76.

59. McClintock, *The American Connection*, 71.

60. AHPN, *Del silencio a la memoria*, 438.

61. McClintock, *The American Connection*, 72–73.

62. See Grandin’s book *The Last Colonial Massacre* for the best account of the 1966 disappearances.

63. For “Communist big-leaguers,” see USE/G to SecState, “Internal Security Situation and Needs,” Guatemala City, 22 May 1961, DNSA, GU00047.

64. John P. Longan to Byron Engle, “TDY Guatemala: November 7 through December 27, 1965,” 4 January 1966, DNSA, GU00244.

65. Grandin, *The Last Colonial Massacre*, 95–96.

66. For “unconfirmed rumors” and “a considerable success,” see Mein/USE/G to AID/Washington, “Public Safety Monthly Report, March 1966,” 13 April 1966, DNSA, GU00279. For increased Public Safety engagement after Mein’s death, see “Summary Statement of AID Program in Guatemala,” 1971, NACP, OPS, Office of the Director, Numerical File 1956–74, Box 1, Folder: History of PS Program—Guatemala FY 70–72.

67. Jennifer Schirmer dates the birth of the G-2 to this period and identifies U.S. military assistance as its key architect. See Schirmer, *The Guatemalan Military Project*, 6.

68. The Ford Bronco was routinely used by special police squads for arrests and disappearances. In this case, the fifty-four vehicles in question were purchased by the Guatemalan military and given to the PN as a gift to help them “guarantee the security and tranquility the Guatemalan people need in order to dedicate themselves to honorable activities”; see “54 Radiopatrullas entrega el Ejército a la Policía Nacional,” *El Imparcial* (1 March 1967). The gift shows how aid to the military sometimes was, by extension, aid to the police, because of resource sharing between the forces, their special-ops collabo-

rations, and the fact that army colonels, usually trained by the United States, ran the PN for almost the entire conflict.

69. "Arzobispo bendijo nuevos vehículos de la policía," *El Imparcial* (14 March 1967). For the relationship between Ponce Nitsch and Ríos Montt, see USE/G to SecState, "Guatemalan Coup Developments: Thunder on the Right, Dissatisfaction by Young Officers," Guatemala City, 25 March 1982, DDRS.

70. AHPN, *Del silencio a la memoria*, 160.

71. For "counterinsurgency coordinator," see USE/G to SecState, "Police Vehicles," 28 October 1966, NACP, Record Group 286, OPS, Technical Services Division, General Correspondence Relating to Geographic Areas, 1965–71, Guatemala–Ivory Coast, Box 4, Folder: Guatemala Chron 3/25/66–12/27/68. Sosa was a close ally of defense minister Rafael Arriaga Bosque, a powerful political actor who had directed the execution of Operación Limpieza.

72. Ted Brown, "Meeting with Colonel Manuel Francisco Sosa, Director General of the National Police," 17 July 1967, NACP, RG 286, OPS, LAB, CF:G, Box 71, Folder IPS 3/Meetings/Guatemala.

73. CIA/DOI, "Intelligence Handbook for Special Operations: Guatemala."

74. Additional corps were added later, as both the city and its police force expanded.

75. USE/G to DOS, "Students Sight in on New Minister of Government," 30 June 1969, NACP, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1967–1969, Political and Defense, Box 2160, Folder POL 13—Guat—1/1/67.

76. Thomas L. Hughes/INR to SecState, "Guatemala: A Counterinsurgency Running Wild?," 23 October 1967, DNSA, GU00348.

77. CIA, February 1968, DNSA, GU00355.

78. USE/G to DOS, "Weeka No. 42," Guatemala City (22 October 1967), NACP, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1967–69; Political and Defense; Box 2158 Folder POL 2–1—Guat—7/1/67.

79. Reprinted in CIDC, *Violencia y contraviolencia*, 103.

80. CIA/DOI, "Intelligence Handbook for Special Operations: Guatemala."

81. Really, it was not much of a bet at all, since during this period AID sent hefty shipments of weapons to both the PN and the Judicial Police. In June 1967, Peter Costello announced to delighted police chiefs that among AID's partner countries, Guatemala had been identified as the highest-priority recipient for a major delivery of "the most modern weapons available on the market." See "Armamentos entregará la AID la la Policía Nacional," *El Imparcial* (27 June 1967).

82. Interview, PRAHPN018; and Ramírez, *La guerra de los 36 años*, 92.

83. "Medidas policíacas," *Prensa Libre* (June 1967).

84. AHPN, *Del silencio a la memoria*, 290.

85. "Medidas policíacas."

86. "Ciento cuarenta policías adiestrados en nuevo plan," *El Imparcial* (28 June 1967).

87. Streeter, "Nation-Building."

88. McClintock, *The American Connection*, 95; and Krujit, *Sociedades de terror*, 36.

89. Cited in USE/G to DOS, "Students Sight in on New Minister of Government."

90. CIA, "Back-Up Material for DCI's June Briefing," 6 June 1969, NACP, CIA—CREST database.

91. USE/G to DOS, "Students Sight in on New Minister of Government."

92. "Una policía en la fusión desde mañana," *El Imparcial* (30 November 1970).

93. "Ocho jefes y ex-jefes de la Policía Secreta han sido muertos a tiros," *El Imparcial* (2 May 1974).

94. CIA/DOI, "Guatemala's Political Transition," 11 March 1970, NACP, CIA-CREST database.

95. For "civilian extremists" and "history of violent, irrational activity," see CIA/DOI, "Guatemala's Political Transition."

96. See *Discursos del Presidente Arana Osorio*, as well as USE/G to DOS, "Biweekly Political Review: November 14–27, 1970," 27 November 1970, NACP, RG 286, OPS, LAB, CF:G, Box 68, unlabeled folder.

97. USAC students' nicknames for Arana are documented in the satirical Huelga de Dolores publication *No Nos Tientes* (Don't Tempt Us) through the 1970s and 1980s.

98. Cited in CIDC, *Violencia y contraviolencia*, 108.

99. From "Mensaje de paz y esperanza dirigido al pueblo en la vigilia de Navidad," reprinted in *Discursos del Presidente Arana*.

100. State Department, "FY 72 Program Review," 27 July 1970, NSA/GDP.

101. For the spike in violence after Arana took office, see CIDC, *Violencia y contraviolencia*, 105.

102. Viron P. Vaky to Covey T. Oliver, "Guatemala and Counter-terror," 29 March 1968, DNSA, GU00367.

103. U.S. Embassy/Guatemala to State Department, "Debriefing of Sean M. Holly," Guatemala City, 16 March 1970, NACP, RG 286, OPS, LAB, CF:G; Box 73, Folder: IPS 14/Kidnapping/Guatemala. In his statement, Holly noted with surprise that his captors did not seem to view Arana with any particular rancor, seeing him merely as a "puppet" of the far right; they did, however, single out Colonel Sosa as a "butcher."

104. USE/G to SecState, "Ojo Por Ojo," 19 May 1970, NACP, RG 286, OPS, LAB, CF:G, Box 73, Folder: IPS-8/Narcotics Training/Guatemala.

105. Mario Ramírez Ruiz, "Experiencias que deben aprovecharse dentro de la organización policial," *Revista de la Policía Nacional* 4, no. 7 (September–October 1970): 12, HN.

106. "Escuela de Capacitación de la Policía Nacional," *Revista de la Policía Nacional* 5, no. 8 (February–April 1971): 8, HN.

107. Héctor René Rivera Méndez, "La instrucción como medio de superación en el servicio policial," *Revista de la Policía Nacional* 5, no. 8 (February–April 1971): 40, HN. As of 1971, the PN required all applicants for new or renewed driver's licenses to register their fingerprints in the archives, thus tightening control over everyday Guatemalans. See PDH, *El derecho a saber*, 178.

108. AHPN, *Del silencio a la memoria*, 288. Applying for the new *cedula* cards required Guatemalans to provide photographs along with their birthplace, birth date, sex, civil state, nationality, age, skin color, height, weight, hair color, hair texture, general state of health, eye and nose shape, profession, address, parents' names, and any other physical or psychological data deemed necessary by the intake official. See AHPN, *Del silencio a la memoria*, 470, for a representative *cedula* application in the name of Anastacio Sotz Coy, who headed a campesino organization in 1980 when he was captured, tortured, and executed, allegedly by the military. Though the PN had documented Sotz Coy's death and

mutilation, it never released this information to his family or to lawyers investigating his case, such that the murdered Sotz Coy remained "disappeared" for more than thirty years before the Project's research revealed his fate.

109. Joseph Sobotta, "Survey of the Guatemala Police Forces Weapons System," 9 October 1970, Courtesy NSA/GDP.

110. David R. Powell to DOS, "Review of FY 72 Country Field Submission (CFS) Guatemala," 10 August 1970, Courtesy NSA/GDP.

111. Grandin points out this argument's recurrence in declassified U.S. documents in his *Denegado en su totalidad*.

112. USE/G to SecState, "University Rector's Life Threatened by 'Ojo Por Ojo,'" 6 October 1971, NACP, RG 59, SNF 1970–1973, Political and Defense, Box 2337, Folder: POL 23—Guat—1/1/71.

113. For "unscrupulous persons," see USE/G to SecState, "Disappearance of Communist Leaders," 29 September 1972, NACP, RG 59, SNF 1970–1973, Political and Defense, Box 2336, Folder: POL 12—Guat. For "police sources," see USE/G to DOS, "Internal Security: Monthly Report of Incidents, November 1972," 19 December 1972, NACP, RG 59, SNF 1970–1973, Political and Defense, Box 2337, Folder: POL 23—Guat—1/1/70.

114. USE/G to SecState, "Internal Security: Monthly Report of Incidents, January 1973," 9 February 1973, NACP, RG 59, SNF 1970–1973, Political and Defense, Box 2337, folder POL 23—Guat—1/1/70.

115. Byron Engle to Robert A. Hurwitch, "Creation of a Special Action Unit within the National Police to Assume Death Squad Functions," 11 October 1972, NACP, RG 286, OPS, LAB, CF:G, Box 72, Folder: IPS-8/Telegrams/Guatemala. The memorandum, recently declassified, is heavily redacted.

116. John H. Caldwell, "Guatemala CASP, FY 73–74," 9 March 1972, NACP, RG 286, OPS, LAB, CF:G, Box 4, Folder: IPS 1–1.

117. NSC, "Country Analysis and Strategy Paper—FY 73–74—Guatemala," 4 May 1972, NSA/GDP.

118. NSC, "Country Analysis and Strategy Paper."

119. McClintock, *The American Connection*, 101.

120. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, *Guatemala and the Dominican Republic*, staff memorandum, Pat Holt (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1971); cited in McClintock, *The American Connection*, 101.

121. See Lobe, "The Rise and Demise," 192; also Langguth, *Hidden Terrors*; Kuzmarov, "Modernizing Repression."

122. Cited in Huggins, *Political Policing*, 187.

123. Huggins, *Political Policing*, 187.

124. Kuzmarov's account of OPS trainees' abuses in South Vietnam is chilling. Kuzmarov, "Modernizing Repression," 209–19.

125. Huggins, *Political Policing*, 192.

126. Huggins, *Political Policing*, 195.

127. See Abourezk's statement on the Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 21 June 1974, NACP, CIA-CREST database.

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Research for this book was conducted at the Historical Archives of the National Police (AHPN), the Archivo General de Centroamérica (AGCA), the Centro de Investigaciones Regionales de Mesoamérica (CIRMA), the Hemeroteca Nacional (HN), the National Security Archive's Guatemala Documentation Project (NSA/CGP), the archives of the Tipografía Nacional (TN), and the U.S. National Archives at College Park (NACP). I also obtained digitized documents from the Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), the Digital National Security Archive (DNSA), and the Central Intelligence Agency FOIA Reading Room (CIA/F). Periodicals cited in the notes are listed below. Most can be found in the Hemeroteca Nacional, in CIRMA's press clippings archive, or in the AGCA's own *hemeroteca*. Interviews with workers at the Project for the Recovery of the National Police Historical Archives (PRAHPN) were conducted confidentially, except in the cases of a handful of leaders who had already identified themselves to the national or international press. I assigned an internal code number to each interview with a PRAHPN worker, and gave each worker a pseudonym in the text. Interviews with external figures were nonconfidential. All interviews were conducted in Guatemala City.

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